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 Bowman v. Monsanto Co.: A Bellwether for 
the Emerging Issue of Patentable Self-
Replicating Technologies and Inadvertent 
Infringement 
Christopher M. Holman* 
ABSTRACT 
The inherent tendency of patented seeds to self-replicate has led to fears 
that farmers might face liability for inadvertent patent infringement.  To ad-
dress the perceived problem, some have proposed severely limiting the avail-
ability of effective patent protection for self-replicating technologies.  Typical 
examples include denying patent rights to “second generation” self-
replicating products, and even broadly declaring such technologies ineligible 
for patent protection.  The fact is, lawsuits against inadvertently infringing 
farmers remain of largely hypothetical concern.  However, changes in the 
market could soon render such lawsuits a reality.  In addressing the resulting 
policy concerns, Congress and the courts have at their disposal a variety of 
doctrinal tools that could effectively shield legitimately inadvertent infringers 
from liability without unduly weakening the ability of patents to incentivize 
investment in the development of self-replicating technologies.  A failure to 
do so could have dramatic unintended consequences for a host of emerging 
self-replicating technologies in areas as diverse as synthetic biology, nano-
technology, computer software, and even space exploration.  Congress and 
the courts have already addressed problems of inadvertent copyright in-
fringement that have arisen with respect to software and other digitally en-
coded content, and some of the same fundamental principles could be re-
cruited to address the emerging issue of inadvertent patent infringement 
caused by the increasing prevalence of patentable self-replicating technolo-
gies.  At the same time, innovators in self-replicating technologies might need 
to seriously consider the implementation of technological restrictions on cop-
ying as a practical alternative to patent protection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Under the judicially-created doctrine of patent exhaustion, “[T]he initial 
authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.”1  
In 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in Bowman 
v. Monsanto Co., a case in which the petitioner sought a dramatic expansion 
of the patent exhaustion doctrine.  In Bowman, the petitioner argued that the 
authorized purchase of a patented product not only exhausts all patent rights 
with respect to the item that was the subject of the authorized sale, but also 
confers upon the purchaser the right to make and distribute an unlimited 
number of perfect copies of the item without the permission of the patent 
owner, and without an obligation to pay any compensation to the patent own-
er.2  On its face, the petition seems almost frivolous, analogous to arguing 
that the purchaser of a single DVD copy of a copyrighted movie should be 
permitted to make an unlimited number of unauthorized copies of the movie 
and distribute or sell the copies without any obligation to compensate the 
copyright owner. 
Of course, copyright law is specifically aimed at preventing the unau-
thorized copying of protected works, but the same principles have been ap-
plied in the context of patents.  It is well established, for example, that the 
purchaser of a patented item is generally not authorized to reconstruct the 
item if it becomes damaged, let alone make new copies of it.3  The purchaser 
of a patented bicycle is certainly permitted to repair the bike, but once the 
bicycle has worn out beyond repair she is not allowed to rebuild it, and she is 
certainly not authorized to use the bicycle as a template for manufacturing 
new copies of the bicycle without the patentee’s permission. 
What would prompt the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a case rais-
ing such an argument?  And why would a large contingent of amici flock to 
support the petitioner’s facially meritless position?  The answer is that this 
was not a case involving bicycles, but instead a product having a very special 
attribute.  The patented product at the center of the litigation was a genetically 
engineered soybean, and the special attribute that distinguishes soybeans 
from the vast majority of patented inventions is their propensity to self-
replicate.4  Unlike bicycles, or virtually any other form of technology that has 
historically been the subject of patent protection, seeds have the inherent abil-
ity to serve as the template for the production of a virtually unlimited number 
of perfect copies of themselves, with relatively minimal, if any, active human 
 
 1. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) (empha-
sis added). 
 2. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1768 (2013) (“Bowman . . . is 
asking for an unprecedented exception – to what he concedes is the ‘well settled’ rule 
that ‘the exhaustion doctrine does not extend to the right to “make” a new product.’”). 
 3. Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
 4. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1764–65. 
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involvement and effort.  And as we shall see, in the minds of many, this ca-
pability of self-replication can make all the difference in the world. 
While Bowman did result in a unanimous decision clarifying that, at 
least as a general matter, patent exhaustion does not extend to second-
generation seeds, the case should be viewed as a bellwether for an oncoming 
wave of controversy around the patenting of self-replicating technologies that 
will challenge the ability of the patent system to respond effectively.  The 
closest analogy might be the impact that the proliferation of digitally-encoded 
content – e.g., movies, music, and software – has had on the copyright sys-
tem.  The ease with which these digitally-encoded works can be copied and 
distributed has enabled massive and widespread copyright infringement, and 
resulted in the enactment of sweeping legislation intended to bolster the copy-
right system.5  Similar stresses on the patent system are on the horizon due to 
an increasing prevalence of self-replicating technologies.  As innovators 
strive to appropriate the value generated by their investment in innovation, 
consumers and policy advocates balk at what might appear to be overly ag-
gressive enforcement of intellectual property (“IP”), and Congress and the 
courts struggle to find a balance between the competing concerns. 
Self-replicating technologies tend to be extremely expensive and diffi-
cult to initially create, but once developed, they are capable of directing their 
own replication at a low cost and with little, if any, human intervention.6  
Patents play a crucial role in incentivizing the development of self-replicating 
technology, but enforcement of these patents creates significant public policy 
concerns.  The current proliferation of infringement litigation involving pa-
tented genetically modified (“GM”) seeds has already resulted in a great deal 
of controversy.  As of yet, however, the controversy has largely been limited 
to a single patent owner, Monsanto, and a single first-generation transgenic 
technology marketed by Monsanto under the trademark, Roundup Ready®.7  
As subsequent generations of patented GM seeds and plants reach the market, 
along with non-agricultural self-replicating products that are being developed 
by innovators in synthetic biology and nanotechnology, the controversy will 
extend well beyond Monsanto and Roundup Ready.  When it does, society 
will be confronted with a host of compelling and potentially irreconcilable 
policy concerns that are largely without precedent in patent law. 
The Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari in Bowman highlights 
the fact that it is not too early for those concerned with innovation policy to 
 
 5. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105–304, 112 Stat. 
2860 (1998). 
 6. See generally N.Y. Univ., Self-Replication Process Holds Promise for Pro-
duction of New Materials, SCI. DAILY (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2011/10/111012132651.htm. 
 7. Roundup Ready® is a Monsanto technology based upon the recombinant 
introduction of a synthetic gene into a crop plant that renders the plant tolerant of the 
herbicide glyphosate (which is marketed by Monsanto under the trade name Round-
up®).  Roundup Ready Crops, SOURCEWATCH, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.
php/Roundup_Ready_Crops (last visited July 12, 2015). 
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begin giving serious thought to how the patent system will respond to the 
challenge of self-replicating technologies in a manner that maintains adequate 
incentives for innovation while addressing the specific concerns associated 
with patent enforcement in this area.  One of the most pressing issues is the 
potential for inadvertent infringement inherent in many self-replicating tech-
nologies, particularly seeds like the Roundup Ready soybeans that Vernon 
Bowman planted and which ultimately brought him before the Supreme 
Court.  Although Bowman himself was clearly not an inadvertent infringer, 
since he knowingly and intentionally took full advantage of the patented 
Roundup Ready technology present in the soybeans he cultivated, the poten-
tial for inadvertent infringement by other farmers appears to have played an 
important role in the decision to grant certiorari.8  Significantly, the Bowman 
Court explicitly left the door open to revisiting the issue in a future case and 
potentially extending the doctrine of patent exhaustion under circumstances 
where the intent and knowledge of an accused farmer is less clear-cut.9 
I.  THE INCREASING PREVALENCE OF PATENTABLE SELF-
REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES 
In Bowman, the Supreme Court recognized that “[self-replicating] in-
ventions are becoming ever more prevalent, complex, and diverse.”10  This 
represents a new trend in patentable innovation.  As one commentator recent-
ly pointed out, prior to the advent of biotechnology, “No other field (e.g. me-
chanical engineering, aviation, electronics; maybe with the exception of soft-
ware and computer viruses) has to deal with self-replicating entities.”11  And 
while biological innovation has occurred since the dawn of history, as evi-
denced by poodles and sweet corn – neither of which bears much resem-
blance to the naturally occurring wolves and wild maize from which they 
were derived – until relatively recently the products of this innovation have, 
for the most part, been denied IP protection.12  Although the situation has not 
changed much with respect to agricultural animals, sui generis forms of IP for 
plants in the form of plant patents and plant variety protection certificates 
became available in the United States in 1930 and 1970, respectively.13  More 
recently, the availability of utility patent protection has been extended to in-
novative plants and seeds, both transgenic and the products of more conven-
 
 8. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Markus Schmidt, Do I Understand What I Can Create? Biosafety Issues in 
Synthetic Biology, in SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: THE TECHNOSCIENCE AND ITS SOCIETAL 
CONSEQUENCES 81, 92 (Markus Schmidt et al. eds., 2009). 
 12. An interesting exception to the general rule is Louis Pasteur’s 1873 patent 
directed to purified yeast “free from organic germs of disease, as an article of manu-
facture.”  U.S. Patent No. 141,072 (issued July 22, 1873). 
 13. See infra Part III. 
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tional breeding.14  It is this extension of utility patent protection to plants that 
ultimately led to Bowman and the current controversy surrounding the patent-
ing of GM crops and the enforcement of patents against farmers. 
The defining characteristic of living organisms that renders them self-
replicating, and thus fundamentally distinct from the vast majority of patenta-
ble technologies, is genetic material – usually in the form of DNA – that en-
codes instructions for their own replication.  The extension of patent protec-
tion to computer programs that took root in the 1980s15 was significant in this 
regard, because it created an important new area of patentable technology that 
can reasonably be characterized as self-replicating.  Like living organisms, 
software contains replicable code that can be used to direct the creation of 
copies of itself, with the computer program serving as a functional analog of 
the genome.16  Although one might argue that software is not truly self-
replicating, since its replication only occurs within the confines of a machine, 
by the same token, replication of plants is not entirely autonomous – requir-
ing the right combination of sun, soil, water, and nutrients.  Software replica-
tion results in perfect copies that can be easily disseminated, particularly 
since the development of the Internet, and those perfect copies can them-
selves serve as templates for further replication.  Significantly, the replication 
requires little, if any, active human involvement and is extremely inexpensive 
and easy, relative to the cost of initially developing the software.17  Indeed, a 
lobbying organization representing software companies recently acknowl-
edged in an amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court that software can plau-
sibly be characterized as self-replicating.18 
The facile and largely autonomous replication of software has raised 
significant concerns regarding the ability of IP owners to effectively enforce 
their rights, but to date, these concerns have largely been restricted to the 
realm of copyright, not patent law.  It bears noting that the policy behind the 
expansion of copyright protection to software that occurred in the 1970s was 
largely driven by the ease with which software can be used as the template for 
the production of perfect copies.19  But the extension of copyright protection 
to software is an anomaly.  As a general rule, most patentable technologies 
are not eligible for copyright protection.  Although this author and others 
have written articles in support of extending copyright protection to engi-
 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 16. See Port of Seattle v. Lexington Ins. Co., 48 P.3d 334, 338 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2002). 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. Brief of BSA/The Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Re-
spondents, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 
267020, at *13–14. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
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neered DNA,20 the copyright office has taken the position that DNA is not 
copyrightable,21 and, at least for the time being, that is the state of affairs.  
Outside the realm of software, patents will be the primary, if not the only, 
form of IP protection available for self-replicating technologies, and the pro-
liferation of these technologies will increasingly challenge the existing patent 
system. 
One of the factors driving the surge in self-replicating technologies is 
the increased application of the advanced tools of biotechnology to the devel-
opment and commercialization of improved plants.  Innovation in agricultur-
ally significant seeds is expected to play a critical role in providing more effi-
cient and environmentally benign processes for the production of important 
outputs such as food, fuel, structural materials, and high-value chemicals such 
as pharmaceuticals.22  For example, agricultural biotechnology has already 
markedly improved productivity, particularly for some row crops such as 
corn, cotton, and soybeans; products that have been the primary focus of the 
initial applications of biotechnology crop genetics.23  Given that agriculture is 
inherently destructive of the environment on many levels, any improvement 
that increases efficiency will ameliorate the destruction by reducing the 
amount of acreage necessary to yield a given amount of harvest.24 
Agricultural biotechnology has also helped the environment by allowing 
farmers to use less toxic alternatives to traditional herbicides and pesticides, 
and by permitting farmers to use environmentally friendly farming practices 
such as no-till cultivation.25  Ongoing efforts aimed at producing agricultural 
products that thrive on less water, or that have increased nutritional content, 
will further expand the benefits of agricultural biotechnology, particularly as 
 
 20. See, e.g., Christopher M. Holman, Copyright for Engineered DNA: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Come?, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 699 (2011); Andrew Torrance, DNA 
Copyright, 46 VAL. U. L. REV.  1 (2011). 
 21. Letter from Robert J. Kasunic, Assoc. Register of Copyrights and Dir. 
of Copyright Policy and Practices, U.S. Copyright Office, to author (Feb. 11, 2014) 
(on file with author). 
 22. See, e.g., Dan Towery & Steve Werblow, Facilitating Conservation Farming 
Practices and Enhancing Environmental Sustainability with Agricultural Biotechnol-
ogy, CONSERVATION TECH. INFO. CTR. (2010), http://www.ctic.purdue.edu/media/pdf
/BioTechFINAL%20COPY%20SEND%20TO%20PRINTER.pdf; COMM. ON THE 
IMPACT OF BIOTECH. ON FARM-LEVEL ECONS. AND SUSTAINABILITY ET AL., IMPACT OF 
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS ON FARM SUSTAINABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2010). 
 23. Michael D. Edgerton, Increasing Crop Productivity to Meet Global Needs 
for Feed, Food, and Fuel, 149 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 7, 7 (2009), 
http://www.plantphysiol.org/content/149/1/7.full.pdf+html. 
 24. For example, agriculture in the U.S. is a leading source of water pollution.  
Agriculture: National Water Quality Initiative, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/
polwaste/nps/agriculture.cfm (last visited July 3, 2015). 
 25. Rolf Derpsch et al., Current Status of Adoption of No-till Farming in the 
World and Some of Its Main Benefits, 3 INT’L J. AGRIC. & BIOLOGICAL ENG’G 1, 1 
(2010). 
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the population increases and the availability of arable land diminishes due to 
salinization and other related phenomena.26 
The use of biotechnology to create new self-replicating technologies is 
by no means limited to agriculture.  Other examples include live vaccines, 
recombinant DNA products, engineered viruses, and other engineered micro-
organisms that have practical applications in a wide variety of contexts.27  
The relatively new field of synthetic biology, which many believe represents 
the next generation of innovation in biotechnology, will thrust the issue of 
self-replicating technologies front and center.28  A significant event in this 
regard occurred in 2010, when Craig Venter and his team announced that 
they had successfully “booted up” the first entirely synthetic living organ-
ism.29  Dr. Venter aptly characterized this tour de force of synthetic biology 
as “the first self-replicating cell we’ve had on the planet whose parent is a 
computer.”30 
Nanotechnology represents another important new area of technology 
that is predicted to result in the development of useful self-replicating prod-
ucts.31  Research into macro-machines with the capability of self-replication, 
including self-replicating spacecraft, is also ongoing.32  Self-replication pro-
vides many advantages, but it will also give rise to novel and largely unprec-
edented questions of policy, particularly with respect to IP and innovation 
policy. 
II.  INNOVATION IN SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES REQUIRES 
EFFECTIVE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Intellectual property spurs innovation by enabling innovators to appro-
priate the value created by their investment in conceiving, developing, and 
commercializing new technologies.  Self-replicating technologies are particu-
larly vulnerable to free-riding by copyists, rendering effective IP protection, 
or a functional analog such as technological restrictions on copying, critically 
 
 26. See generally FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS: STATISTICS DIVISION, http://faostat.fao.org/ (last visited July 3, 2015) (for 
numerous links to statistical data domains). 
 27. See What is Biotechnology?, BIO, http://www.bio.org/node/517 (last visited 
July 3, 2015). 
 28. Christopher M. Holman, Developments in Synthetic Biology Are Altering the 
IP Imperatives of Biotechnology, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 387  (2014). 
 29. Logan Ward, Craig Venter Boots up First Synthetic Cell, POPULAR 
MECHANICS (May 20, 2010, 11:57 AM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/
health/breakthroughs/synthetic-cell-breakthrough. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Joyce Trait, Governing Synthetic Biology: Process and Outcome, in 
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, supra note 11, at 141, 149 (“[D]evelopments involving active 
nano-systems [i.e., nanotechnology] may ultimately be self-replicating.”). 
 32. Ralph C. Merkle, NASA and Self-Replicating Systems: Implications for Nan-
otechnology, FORESIGHT UPDATE 9, at 2 (June 30, 1990). 
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important for the sustenance of an optimal level of innovation.  The self-
replicating nature of software, for example, and the uncertainty with respect 
to the availability of patent protection for computer programs,33 was a driving 
force in the extension of copyright protection to encompass computer pro-
grams.34  In considering the role of IP in the development of self-replicating 
technologies, it is worth briefly reviewing some of the historical context sur-
rounding this dramatic – and at the time, controversial – expansion of the 
scope of copyrightable subject matter.35 
In the 1970s, Congress established a commission of experts to study and 
make recommendations regarding how copyright law should respond to vari-
ous technological developments occurring at the time, most notably the in-
creasing commercial significance of computer software.36  In particular, the 
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 
(“CONTU”) was asked to consider and make recommendations with respect 
to the question of whether computer programs could be protected under cur-
rent copyright law, and, if not, whether copyright law should be amended to 
accommodate computer programs.37  CONTU issued its highly influential 
report in 1978, which concluded not only that copyright protection for com-
puter programs was justified both in terms of legal doctrine and innovation 
policy, but that computer programs were already implicitly copyrightable 
under both the 1976 and 1909 Copyright Acts. 38 
The ease with which software replicates was an important factor in 
CONTU’s determination that, as a matter of policy, copyright should be ex-
tended to software.  In its report, the Commission found the underlying prin-
ciple of copyright to be that “if the cost of duplicating information is small, 
and it is simple for a less than scrupulous person to duplicate it[,] legal as 
well as physical protection for the information is a necessary incentive if such 
information is to be created and disseminated.”39  To illustrate this point, 
CONTU pointed out that, in the nineteenth century, when music was recorded 
on a brass wheel to be played on a music box, “[T]he cost of making the 
 
 33. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 
(1978); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting 
U.S. Patent Office policy in the early 1980s of generally rejecting patents directed 
towards computer programs). 
 34. Holman, supra note 20. 
 35. See Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright 
Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L. J. 663 
(1984); see also NATIONAL COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED 
WORKS, FINAL REPORT 27 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU Report] (Professor Melville 
Nimmer arguing that copyright protection should generally not be extended to com-
puter programs). 
 36. Samuelson, supra note 35, at 694–95. 
 37. CONTU Report, supra note 35, at 1. 
 38. Id. at 16. 
 39. Id. at 10. 
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wheel was inseparable from the cost of producing the final product.”40  How-
ever, with the development of easily copied magnetic tapes, legal protection 
for recorded music became essential, and Congress responded to this need by 
passing the Sound Recording Act of 1971.41 
By the same token, CONTU found that while there was little reason to 
protect the wired circuit or plug boards used to communicate instructions in 
early computers, the ease with which modern software can be copied weighed 
heavily in favor of providing effective IP protection for computer programs in 
the form of copyright.42  In 1980, Congress adopted the Commission’s rec-
ommendation and amended the Copyright Act to include a definition of 
“computer programs,”43 and courts have interpreted the amendment as signal-
ing congressional approval for copyright protection of software.44 
Prior to 1980, it was also unclear whether utility patent protection was 
available for plants and seeds.  Congress addressed the free-rider problem 
associated with the ease with which plants can be copied by enacting sui gen-
eris protection in the form of the Plant Patent Act (1930)45 and Plant Variety 
Protection Act (1970).46  The Supreme Court later clarified that the more 
potent protection provided by utility patents is also available for living organ-
isms, and plants in particular, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty47 and J.E.M. Ag 
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.,48 respectively.  Today’s 
innovation in plants and seeds has become highly capital-intensive, particu-
larly when accomplished by means of the cutting-edge tools of biotechnolo-
gy,49 and the availability of IP protection has no doubt played an important 
role in incentivizing the necessary investment. 
Amicus briefs filed in Bowman by a diverse collection of stakeholders 
illustrate the importance of effective IP protection not only for seeds, but for 
self-replicating technologies in general.  Indeed, amici on both sides agreed 
that the case had important implications for a variety of self-replicating tech-
nologies.  For example, Knowledge Ecology International filed a brief in 
support of petitioner Bowman, warning that the Court’s decision might “have 
unknown consequences for other forms of self-replicating technologies . . . 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). 
 42. CONTU Report, supra note 35, at 10. 
 43. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 44. Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.04 
(C)(1)–(2) (2015). 
 45. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164 (2012). 
 46. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2583 (2012). 
 47. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 48. 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
 49. On average, a new GE trait requires an investment of $136 million and re-
quires more than thirteen years to develop and commercialize.  Fact Sheet: Getting a 
Biotech Crop to Market, CROPLIFE INT’L, https://croplife.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/04/Fact-Sheet-Getting-a-Biotech-Crop-to-Market.pdf (last visited July 3, 2015). 
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including on organisms, viruses, DNA, or other nanotechnologies.”50  
CropLife International, filing in support of Monsanto, argued that the Court’s 
decision would “either advance or retard the development of, and the public’s 
access to, extraordinary new [self-replicating] inventions of tremendous so-
cial, economic, and environmental value,” such as live vaccines, recombi-
nantly engineered cells, and transgenic animals.51 
The Software Alliance also filed a brief in support of Monsanto, point-
ing out that the “use of computer software typically results in creation of a 
temporary additional copy (or copies) of some or all of the software program 
in the computer’s short-term memory, [which] could in some very general 
sense be labeled ‘self-replication.’”52  The Software Alliance argued that “ap-
plication of petitioner’s theory for seeds in the context of software [i.e., patent 
exhaustion for self-replicating technologies] would open the door to massive 
software piracy.”53  A diverse group of companies engaged in biomedical 
research, diagnostic testing, and industrial scale manufacturing filed their 
own joint amici brief stating that these companies had a vital interest in the 
outcome of the case, because a decision in favor of Bowman “would under-
mine innumerable existing contracts for the commercialization of patented 
innovations and cause significant disruption to amici’s business.”54 
III.  THE HISTORIC ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION 
Thomas Jefferson reportedly opined that “the greatest service which can 
be rendered to any country is to add a useful plant to its culture.”55  Unfortu-
nately, however, throughout much of this country’s history there was little 
incentive for private investment in the development of improved plants genet-
ics.  In the absence of IP protection for sexually reproduced plants, which was 
the de facto state of affairs prior to the passage of the Plant Variety Protection 
Act in 1970,56 it was extremely difficult for a private seed developer to re-
coup an adequate return on investment in innovation.  Farmers could save and 
replant harvested grain, and even sell progeny seeds to other farmers, severe-
 
 50. Brief of Amicus Curiae Knowledge Ecology Int’l in Support of Petitioner, 
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796), 2012 WL 6203695, 
at *4. 
 51. Brief for Amicus Curiae CropLife Int’l Supporting Respondents, Bowman, 
133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 3114457, at *21. 
 52. Brief of BSA/The Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Re-
spondents, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 267020, at *13–14. 
 53. Id. at *15. 
 54. Brief for Agilent Technologies, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 315225, at *1. 
 55. Brief for American Soybean Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Re-
spondents, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 315223, at *4. 
 56. See 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (2012). 
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ly undercutting the ability of a seed developer to charge a premium for an 
improved seed after an initial growing season.57 
The first real opportunity for significant private investment in seed de-
velopment occurred with the introduction of hybrid corn in the 1930s.58  Hy-
brid corn varieties are the product of crossbreeding two inbred parent lines, 
resulting in a hybrid progeny with significantly improved genetic attributes 
relative to either of the inbred parents.59  Significantly, the improved charac-
teristics of the hybrid are generally not carried over into the next generation, 
i.e., hybrid crops do not reproduce “true-to-type.”60  By maintaining physical 
control of the inbred parent lines – supplemented by trade secret protection, 
which courts have found to be available for inbred seeds – a developer of an 
improved hybrid corn can effectively compel farmers to purchase new hybrid 
seed for each planting season rather than replanting saved seed.61 
With an incentive for private investment in place, seed developers like 
Pioneer Hi-Bred began to invest in research and development programs that 
led to real and substantial improvement in the seed characteristics of hybrid 
corn.62  The results speak for themselves.  Between 1866 and 1930, the aver-
age national yield for corn actually decreased from 24.3 to 20.5 bushels per 
acre.63  With the introduction of hybrid corn, yields in the United States in-
creased from 26 bushels per acre in 1926 to 38 bushels per acre in 1950, and 
eventually to 147 bushels per acre in 2011.64 
Unfortunately, most other important agricultural crops, such as soybean, 
barley, cotton and wheat, tend to self-pollinate, which results in progeny that 
are nearly identical to the parent plant in terms of genetics, and as such are 
not amenable to the value capture mechanism available to developers of hy-
brid corn.65  In the absence of any effective mechanism for preventing farm-
ers from replanting seeds gleaned from the harvest of these crops, there re-
 
 57. Debra L. Blair, Intellectual Property Protection and Its Impact on the U.S. 
Seed Industry, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 297, 304 (1999). 
 58. Id. at 304–05. 
 59. Id. at 305. 
 60. See MAARTEN J. CHRISPEELS & DAVID E. SADAVA, PLANTS, GENES, AND 
CROP BIOTECH. 364–65 (2d ed. 2003); see also Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo, The Seed 
Industry in U.S. Agriculture: An Exploration of Data and Information on Crop Seed 
Markets, Regulation, Industry Structure, and Research and Development, USDA 
AGRIC. INFO. BULLETIN NO. 786, 20 (2004), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/
260729/aib786_1_.pdf (“[S]eed saved and planted from the harvest of a hybrid crop 
tends to diminish in yield and vigor in subsequent harvests, thus ensuring breeders a 
continuous market for their seed so long as other higher performing hybrid seeds do 
not enter the market.”). 
 61. Blair, supra note 57, at 308–10; Fernandez-Cornejo, supra note 60, at 20. 
 62. Brief for CropLife Int’l, supra note 51, at *12. 
 63. Brief for American Soybean Ass’n et al., supra note 55, at 11 (citing USDA 
NASS QUICK STATS, www.quickstats.nass.usda.gov (last visited Sept. 23, 2015)). 
 64. Id. at 12–13. 
 65. Id. at 13 (citing to CHRISPEELS & SADAVA, supra note 60, at 368-69). 
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mained little incentive for investment in the improvement of crops other than 
hybrid corn.66 
In 1970, Congress enacted the Plant Variety Protection Act, which for 
the first time provided IP protection for sexually reproduced plants, and thus 
at least some marginal incentive for investment in innovation of these other 
important crops.67  However, significant limitations on the rights conferred by 
plant variety protection certificates, most notably the saved seed exemption 
which allows farmers to save seeds to replant during a subsequent growing 
season, tended to attenuate the value of plant variety protection as compared 
to utility patents, which at the time were generally considered unavailable for 
plants.68  Although plant variety protection certificates have clearly played a 
role in allowing seed developers to recoup some return on investment, they 
have been found to provide relatively low incentives for investment due to 
the limitations on the scope of protection.69 
A major breakthrough in seed innovation occurred in 1980 when, in Di-
amond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the avail-
ability of utility patent protection for genetically engineered living organisms, 
and, by implication, innovative seeds and plants.70  Private seed developers 
responded by substantially increasing their investment in research and devel-
opment, which, between 1979 and 1982, more than doubled from $146 mil-
lion to $305 million in inflation-adjusted terms.71  By the mid-1980s, compa-
nies like Monsanto had begun investing heavily in the use of biotechnology 
to improve seeds, counting on the availability of utility patent protection to 
allow a return on investment.72  In 1994, annual private expenditures on seed 
development in the United States rose to nearly $634 million, and the amount 
had more than tripled by 2010, reaching nearly $2 billion annually.73 
This surge of patent-fueled investment appears to have paid off.  Farm-
ers around the world have enthusiastically adopted Monsanto’s patented 
technology, and today the vast majority of important agricultural crops such 
as soybean, cotton, corn, and canola produced in the United States incorpo-
 
 66. Blair, supra note 57, at 304; Brief for CropLife Int’l, supra note 51, at 15–
16; Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Property Rights and Incentives to Invest in Seed 
Varieties: Governmental Regulations in Argentina, AGBIOFORUM, http://www.
agbioforum.org/v8n23/v8n23a08-kesan.htm (last visited July 12, 2015). 
 67. See generally Jay P. Kesan & Mark D. Janis, U.S. Plant Variety Protection: 
Sound and Fury...? 39 HOUS. L. REV. 727, 729-30, 742 (2002). 
 68. Id. at 774–78. 
 69. Id. at 775. 
 70. See supra Part III. 
 71. Kevin E. Noonan, It Ain’t Necessarily So Down on the Farm: Not All Farm-
ers Agree with Farmer Bowman in Bowman v. Monsanto, PATENTDOCS (Jan. 31, 
2013), http://www.patentdocs.org/2013/02/it-aint-necessarily-so-down-on-the-farm-
not-all-farmers-agree-with-farmer-bowman-in-bowman-v-monsant.html. 
 72. See DANIEL CHARLES, LORDS OF THE HARVEST: BIOTECH, BIG MONEY, AND 
THE FUTURE OF FOOD 5–6 (2001). 
 73. Noonan, supra note 71 (inflation-adjusted to constant 2006 U.S. dollars). 
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rate improved traits developed using biotechnology, many of which are pa-
tented by Monsanto.74  These improvements have led to dramatic increases in 
productivity.  Total U.S. soybean production, for example, has increased 96% 
since 1980, while yields per acre have increased 55%.75  Not only have farm-
ers and consumers benefited, but so has the environment.  On a per-bushel 
basis, the land needed to produce a bushel of soybeans declined by 35%, soil 
erosion decreased 66%, irrigation water applied per unit of production de-
creased by 42%, fuel consumption decreased 42%, and greenhouse gas emis-
sions declined by 41%.76  Maintaining effective mechanisms for appropriat-
ing the value of innovation in seeds and other self-replicating technologies is 
imperative if such improvements are to be sustained. 
IV.  SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES AND INADVERTENT 
INFRINGEMENT 
While the availability of patent protection clearly plays a critical role in 
incentivizing innovation in self-replicating technologies, it has also spawned 
public policy concerns, including a heightened potential for inadvertent in-
fringement.  As a patented product becomes more autonomous in its own 
propagation and dissemination, it is more likely that a purported maker or 
user of the product will unintentionally engage in what might be character-
ized as an infringing use or manufacture of the product.  Particularly prob-
lematic is the fact that with respect to many self-replicating technologies, 
particularly biological products such as plants and seeds, “use” of the product 
can be inextricably bound up with “making” of the product.  As a general 
matter, purchasers of a product are authorized to use the product, but not to 
make copies of the product, 77 and when using and making become one in the 
same the potential for inadvertent infringement can come to the forefront. 78 
Software is an example of a non-biological self-replicating technology 
where making and using can be one in the same, thereby creating a potential 
for inadvertent infringement.  The use of computer software often involves 
copying the program from a computer’s permanent memory into temporary 
 
 74. Report Shows Biotech Crop Varieties Continue to be Preferred by U.S. 
Farmers, BIOTECH. INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION (July 17, 2014), http://www.bio.org/
media/press-release/report-shows-biotech-crop-varieties-continue-be-preferred-us-
farmers; see also Fernandez-Cornejo, supra note 60, at 21, 34; Janet Carpenter & 
Leonard Ganassi, Herbicide Tolerant Soybeans: Why Growers Are Adopting Roundup 
Ready Varieties, 2 J. AGROBIOTECH. MGMT. & ECON. 65 (1999). 
 75. Keystone Alliance for Sustainable Agric., Environmental and Socioeconomic 
Indicators for Measuring Outcomes of On-Farm Agricultural Production in the Unit-
ed States, FIELD TO MARKET 8 (December 2012), http://www.fieldtomarket.org/
report/national-2/PNT_SummaryReport_A11.pdf. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
 78. E.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
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memory, which technically constitutes copyright infringement.79  In other 
words, the simple act of using a lawfully purchased computer program could, 
in principle, subject the user to copyright infringement liability for the copy-
ing that inadvertently occurs.  This has never become an issue for a variety of 
reasons, not the least of which is it would make little sense for software com-
panies to sue their customers for a technical act of infringement that neces-
sarily occurs whenever the product is used.80  But in order to avoid any ambi-
guity, Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. § 117, which explicitly provides a statuto-
ry exemption from infringement liability for acts of copying that occurred in 
the natural course of using computer software by an authorized user.81 
Congress has yet to legislate any statutory exception analogous to 17 
U.S.C. § 117 to deal with the potential concerns associated with the inadvert-
ent infringement of biological inventions, although, as discussed below, it is 
an option that might be worth considering.82  However, it is precisely this 
linkage between using and making patented seeds, and thus the potential for 
inadvertent infringement by farmers and other users of seeds, that Bowman 
and his supporting amici relied on in arguing for an extension of the scope of 
patent exhaustion to cover the progeny seed produced in the course of using 
lawfully purchased authorized seed.83  The issue has also been the subject of 
substantial judicial attention and academic commentary.84 
One of the most oft-cited avenues for potential inadvertent infringement 
involves contamination by “genetic drift,” a scenario in which patented genet-
ically modified genetic material drifts onto an unwitting farmer’s property, 
either in the form of pollen or seed, thereby contaminating the farmer’s 
crop.85  But contamination by genetic drift is not the only potential source of 
inadvertent infringement; there are a variety of other means by which unau-
 
 79. ROBERT BRAUNEIS & ROGER SCHECHTER, COPYRIGHT: A CONTEMPORARY 
APPROACH 46, 811 (2012); Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1368 (citing MAI 
Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 80. Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professor Christopher M. Holman in Support of 
Respondents, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796), 2013 
WL 314459, at *3. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See infra Part X. 
 83. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1768. 
 84. E.g., Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 
2d 544, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345–46 
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Brief for Ctr. for Food Safety & Save our Seeds as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341 (No. 11-796), 2012 WL 6591149, at 
*38–40; Michelle Ma, Comment, Anticipating and Reducing the Unfairness of Mon-
santo’s Inadvertent Infringement Lawsuits: A Proposal to Import Copyright Law’s 
Notice-and-Takedown Regime into the Seed Patent Context, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 
703 (2012); Hilary Preston, Note, Drift of Patented Genetically Engineered Crops: 
Rethinking Liability Theories, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1153 (2003); Jill Sudduth, Where the 
Wild Wind Blows: Genetically Altered Seed and Neighboring Farmers, 2001 DUKE L. 
& TECH. REV. 15 (2001). 
 85. See generally, Preston, supra note 84. 
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thorized patented plants might end up growing in a farmer’s field and which 
might plausibly be characterized as inadvertent.  For example, a farmer might 
plant seed derived from a secondary marketing channel, such as commodity 
grain purchased from a local grain elevator – i.e., grain that is intended to be 
sold as food or fodder, not as seed to be replanted – or saved seed purchased 
from another farmer, without knowing that the seed is covered by a patent.  
While the planting of the seed was intentional, a farmer could argue that his 
intent was merely to access an inexpensive source of seed, and that the pres-
ence of the patented trait was inadvertent. 
Even if the farmer knows – or at least strongly suspects – that the seeds 
contain the patented trait, in a sense, any infringement that results from plant-
ing and cultivating the seeds might be characterized as inadvertent since he is 
arguably doing nothing more than engaging in a traditional farming practice – 
i.e., the planting of saved seed or commodity seed – but that due to the wide-
spread use of patented seed in his locale, he has been effectively forced to 
plant seed bearing the patented trait.86  Another scenario might be where sec-
ond-generation seed from a previous planting remains in the field after har-
vest and germinates in a subsequent season, resulting in the unauthorized 
presence of a patented plant in the farmer’s field, or where inadvertent con-
tamination by patented seeds arises out of seed “commingling via tainted 
equipment during harvest or post-harvest activities, processing, transporta-
tion, and storage.”87 
It is generally assumed that direct patent infringement is a matter of 
strict liability, with no element of intent.88  But while strict liability might be 
acceptable for most technologies, the ease with which seeds can spread and 
reproduce relatively autonomously raises serious public policy concerns if it 
results in farmers being exposed to liability for the mere presence of patented 
plants on the farmer’s property, without the farmer purposefully intending 
that the patented material be in his fields.  In some cases, the presence of pa-
tented plants will not necessarily benefit the farmer, which would compound 
the inequity of holding the farmer liable.  In fact, far from being a benefit, a 
farmer who does not wish to grow genetically modified crops in his field 
could characterize the “infringement” as a harmful contamination.89 
Another objection to holding farmers liable for inadvertent infringement 
is that it could interfere with the ability of farmers to engage in what many 
would characterize as traditional farming practices.90  For example, plant 
variety certification under the Plant Variety Protection Act explicitly allows 
farmers to save and replant progeny seeds, but the practice could subject the 
 
 86. This was essentially Bowman’s argument.  Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. 
Supp. 2d 834, 835–36 (S.D. Ind. 2009). 
 87. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1357 
(Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 88. See infra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 89. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1360. 
 90. Id. 
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farmer to liability for patent infringement.91  Liability for inadvertent in-
fringement also impedes the ability of farmers to plant commodity grain ob-
tained from a grain elevator, or to plant brownbag seed harvested and resold 
by other farmers, again, arguably traditional farming practices.92 
V.  THE MYTH THAT MONSANTO IS SUING FARMERS FOR 
INADVERTENT INFRINGEMENT 
While the self-replicability of seeds undoubtedly creates the potential 
for lawsuits against inadvertently infringing farmers, the problem seems to 
remain a largely hypothetical one.  In spite of a widespread perception that 
Monsanto is in the habit of suing farmers for inadvertent infringement, fueled 
largely by inaccurate reports in print and on the Internet, after diligent inquiry 
this author has been unable to find a single clear and documented example of 
such an occurrence.  Given the large number of lawsuits Monsanto has filed 
against farmers, it would be exceedingly difficult to absolutely rule out the 
possibility of inadvertent infringement in each of these cases.93  However, 
this author has attempted by various means to identify examples of such an 
occurrence and has concluded that the evidence supporting the proposition 
that Monsanto has sued farmers for inadvertent infringement of seed patents 
is, at best, weak. 
One of the most oft-cited “examples” of Monsanto allegedly suing a 
farmer for inadvertent infringement is the case of Monsanto Canada Inc. v. 
Schmeiser, which involved a Canadian farmer sued for infringing use of 
Roundup Ready canola.94  Although the myth that Schmeiser was the victim 
of inadvertent infringement caused by seeds “drifting” onto his property has 
taken strong root in popular culture,95 anyone who actually reads the deci-
sions issued by the Canadian courts will find that the Canadian judges were 
 
 91. See Kesan & Janis, supra note 67, at 751. 
 92. See infra Part VII.D. 
 93. According to a study conducted by the Center for Food Safety, a non-profit 
public interest group highly critical of Monsanto and agricultural biotechnology, as of 
November 28, 2012, Monsanto had filed 142 patent infringement lawsuits involving 
410 farmers and 56 small farm businesses in 27 states.  Monsanto v. US Farmers: 
2012 Update, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY (2012), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/
files/monsanto-v-us-farmer-2012-update-final_98931.pdf. 
 94. Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.). 
 95. See, e.g., Myth: Monsanto Sues Farmers When GMOs or GM Seed is Acci-
dentally in Their Fields, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/
Pages/gm-seed-accidentally-in-farmers-fields.aspx (last visited July 3, 2015); JANISSE 
RAY, THE SEED UNDERGROUND: A GROWING REVOLUTION TO SAVE FOOD 116–17 
(2012) (“The Schmeisers had been afflicted with something known as ‘genetic drift,’ 
the billowing of seedmatter by wind from neighboring farms onto their own.”); Erica 
(last name unknown), Plant Sex: Open Pollinated, Hybrid and GMO Seeds, 
NORTHWEST EDIBLE LIFE (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.nwedible.com/2013/01/plant-
sex-open-pollinated-hybrid-and-gmo-seeds.html. 
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unambiguously convinced by the evidence that Percy Schmeiser was not the 
victim of drift and inadvertent contamination, but rather a disingenuous and 
willful patent infringer who had taken affirmative steps to intentionally in-
fringe Monsanto’s patents.96 
Although it is difficult to entirely rule out the possibility of inadvertent 
infringement in any of the lawsuits filed by Monsanto, it does seem clear that 
no case brought by Monsanto against farmers that has been decided at the 
appellate level in the United States has involved a farmer who could plausibly 
claim to be the victim of inadvertent infringement.  To the contrary, in each 
case it was clear that the farmer knew he was planting patented technology 
without Monsanto’s authorization and intended to benefit from the use of the 
technology without paying for it.  For example, the Federal Circuit explicitly 
pointed out that Bowman had signed a Pioneer Hi-Bred technology agree-
ment, with language and restrictions identical to the Monsanto technology 
agreement, and then proceeded to plant second-generation seed he obtained 
from a local grain elevator from 1999 through 2007.97  Bowman also benefit-
ed from the technology by applying glyphosate to his crops.  In fact, he was 
quite open about his purposeful use of the patented technology, candidly re-
porting it to Monsanto.98 
Prior to Bowman, the Federal Circuit decided four other cases involving 
infringement of Monsanto’s seed patents by farmers, none of which would 
support a plausible argument of inadvertent infringement.  The first of these, 
Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, involved a farmer who purchased Roundup Ready 
soybean seeds and cotton seeds, signed a Technology Agreement stipulating 
that he would not replant progeny seeds, and then proceeded to do just that 
during multiple growing seasons.99  Not only was Ralph’s infringement inten-
tional and calculated to take full benefit of the patented technology without 
paying for it, the farmer demonstrated dishonesty throughout the proceedings, 
a recurring theme in a number of the litigations this author reviewed.100  For 
 
 96. See Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, at para. 6, 87; Organic Seed Growers & 
Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Dan 
Charles, Top-Five Myths of Genetically Modified Seeds, Busted, NPR (Oct. 18, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2012/10/18/163034053/top-five-myths-of-
genetically-modified-seeds-busted (Canadian judges were convinced that “Schmeiser 
intentionally planted Roundup Ready canola.”); Alan McHughen & Robert Wager, 
Popular Misconceptions: Agricultural Biotechnology, 27 NEW BIOTECH. 724, 726 
(2010). 
 97. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 100. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Hargrove, No. 4:09-CV-1628 (CEJ), 2011 WL 
5330674, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2011) (“Defendants’ behavior during this litigation 
(which resulted in their answer being stricken and their default for failing to comply 
with the court orders) prevented plaintiffs from conducting discovery as to defend-
ants’ size and financial condition, the duration of defendants’ misconduct, defendants’ 
motivation for harm, and whether defendants attempted to conceal their miscon-
duct.”); Monsanto Co. v. Roman, No. Civ.A. 103CV068-C, 2004 WL 1107671, at *8 
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example, Ralph made numerous misrepresentations to the court, including 
representing under oath that he did not save any seed, a lie that he only re-
canted after the district court judge confronted him with evidence to the con-
trary.101  He also violated court orders, destroyed evidence, and engaged in 
intentional obstructions of the discovery process, which the court found had 
forced Monsanto to take depositions that would not have been necessary if 
Ralph had cooperated.102 
The next case decided by the Federal Circuit, Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 
involved another farmer who purchased Roundup Ready soybean seeds and 
cotton seeds, and then proceeded to harvest and replant progeny second-
generation seeds without Monsanto’s permission, a violation of the terms 
Monsanto requires of all farmers using its technology.103  Scruggs did not 
sign the technology agreement, but he clearly understood he was violating 
Monsanto’s patents, and his only defense was based on arguments that Mon-
santo’s patents did not cover progeny seed, arguments that have been rejected 
by the Federal Circuit.104 
The next case, Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, involved another farmer that 
had purchased patented seed, signed the Technology Agreement agreeing not 
to replant progeny seed, and then proceeded to do so in subsequent growing 
seasons without paying the license fee.105  Finally, Monsanto Co. v. David 
involved a farmer who had not purchased a sufficient amount of Roundup 
Ready soybeans to completely plant his soybean fields, and who then pro-
ceeded to apply a large amount of glyphosate-based herbicide to his fields 
“that would destroy any plants that did not contain the Roundup Ready gene, 
and would therefore have destroyed any conventional soybean seed David 
planted.”106 
In an attempt to identify a case involving an inadvertently infringing 
farmer that perhaps never made it to the appellate level, I searched the 
Westlaw database for any reported decision arising out of a lawsuit filed by 
Monsanto against a farmer for infringement of a seed patent, but after review-
ing each of those decisions – and the complaints when available on Westlaw 
– I could not find a single example in which a farmer credibly argued inad-
vertent infringement.107  To the contrary, it appeared to be the case that in the 
vast majority, if not all, of the cases, the farmer is at least aware of the fact 
that he is infringing.  In most cases there is evidence that the farmer was tak-
 
n.15 (N.D. Tex. May 17, 2004) (“Roman does claim in his Response to have signed a 
license agreement in 1996, although there is evidence from his own deposition testi-
mony that he never signed any such agreement.”). 
 101. Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1378. 
 102. Id. at 1378–79. 
 103. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 104. See id. at 1334–35. 
 105. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 106. Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 107. I performed and analyzed Westlaw federal courts database searches in July 
2014 for reported decisions and complaints filed by Monsanto. 
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ing advantage of the patented technology, e.g., spraying his fields with herbi-
cide that would kill his crops in the absence of the patented technology. 
Furthermore, it seems clear that I am not the only legal researcher who 
has been unable to find such a case.  The fact that so many opponents of 
Monsanto continue to incorrectly point to Percy Schmeiser as the leading 
example of a farmer sued by Monsanto for inadvertent infringement implies 
that those making the allegation are not aware of any actual example of a 
lawsuit filed by Monsanto based on inadvertent infringement.  There are nu-
merous public interest organizations vehemently opposed to Monsanto who 
have had a strong interest in finding such a case, but they have apparently 
been unable to do so. 
The Public Patent Foundation (“PubPat”) is a good example of an ap-
parently sophisticated and competent legal organization highly motivated to 
identify a case of a farmer being sued for inadvertent infringement.108  In 
Organic Seed Growers, PubPat brought a lawsuit on behalf of a number of 
organizations representing organic farmers and others seeking to invalidate a 
large number of Monsanto patents relating to biotechnology and agriculture, 
including a number of patents on seeds.109  In an attempt to establish stand-
ing, PubPat claimed that the plaintiff farmers faced the threat of being sued 
for inadvertent infringement.110  But in denying standing, the district court 
found that although the “plaintiffs allege without specification that [Monsanto 
has] accused certain non-intentional users of Monsanto’s seed of patent in-
fringement and threatened them with [litigation, no] plaintiffs claim to have 
been so threatened.”111  Although the complaint purported to identify specific 
lawsuits that had been filed against farmers who had not intentionally planted 
patented Monsanto seeds, none of whom were plaintiffs in the case, the dis-
trict court found this assertion to be “belied by the decisions in the suits 
against the referenced individuals.”112  In fact, the cases cited in the complaint 
as supposed examples of Monsanto suing inadvertently infringing farmers 
invariably involved a defendant charged with intentionally saving and re-
planting second-generation patented seeds or inducing others to infringe 
Monsanto’s patents.113 
 
 108. PubPat lawyers had the wherewithal to successfully challenge the patent 
eligibility of so-called gene patents in the Supreme Court in Association for Molecu-
lar Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).  Association For Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, ACLU (June 13, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/cases
/association-molecular-pathology-v-myriad-genetics. 
 109. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 110. Id. at 1354. 
 111. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 
544, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 112. Id. at 552. 
 113. Id.  Examples of cases found to be mischaracterized by plaintiffs included 
Monsanto Co. v. Parr, 545 F. Supp. 2d 836, 842–44 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (“[D]efendant 
intentionally induced others to infringe Monsanto’s patents”); Monsanto Co. v. Nel-
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Another public interest organization highly motivated to identify specif-
ic instances of lawsuits based on inadvertent infringement is the Center for 
Food Safety (“CFS”), which filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court in 
support of Bowman.114  The brief alleges that Monsanto has “sued farmers . . 
. in cases where their fields were potentially contaminated by pollen or seed 
from someone else’s transgenic crop; [and] when transgenic seed from a pre-
vious year’s crop sprouted, or ‘volunteered,’ in fields planted with conven-
tional varieties the following year.”115  No specific examples are provided in 
the brief, which instead cites to a 2005 report prepared by CFS entitled Mon-
santo vs. U.S. Farmers.116  A close inspection of the specific examples cited 
in the 2005 report reveals that they provide, at best, weak support for the idea 
that Monsanto has sued inadvertent infringers.117 
Monsanto vs. U.S. Farmers provides only one example of a farmer sup-
posedly sued for infringement based on genetic drift – which the report refers 
to as “biological contamination” – and that farmer was Percy Schmeiser.118  
The Canadian courts found Schmeiser to be anything but an inadvertent in-
fringer.119  The report goes on to characterize a lawsuit filed by Monsanto 
against a farmer named Hendrik Hartkamp as “[o]ne of the more drastic ex-
amples of a riches to rags story as the result of prosecution by Monsanto.”120  
Although the report characterized Hartkamp’s unauthorized use of Monsan-
to’s patented technology without a license as “entirely unwitting,” the judge 
who decided the case issued an order which found as a matter of undisputed 
fact that “after the 1999 soybean crop emerged, [Hartkamp] sprayed the crop 
with Roundup Ultra herbicide,” and that he “did not obtain either a license or 
other authorization from Monsanto to plant Roundup Ready soybean seed in 
either 1998 or 1999.”121 
 
son, No. 4:00-CV-1636, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25132, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 10, 
2001) (Monsanto alleged that defendants violated their licensing agreement by inten-
tionally saving and replanting second generation seed with patented traits); and Mon-
santo Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.T. 256, para. 120 (Can.) (the trial court 
found that the defendant had saved and planted seed “he knew or ought to have 
known was Roundup tolerant”). 
 114. Brief for Food Safety and Save our Seeds as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796), 2012 WL 
6591149. 
 115. Id. at *15–16. 
 116. Id. at *1–2; see Monsanto vs. U.S. Farmers, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY (2005), 
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/cfsmonsantovsfarmerreport11305.pdf. 
 117. Brief for Food Safety and Save our Seeds, supra note 114. 
 118. Monsanto vs. U.S. Farmers, supra note 116, at 38. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 42. 
 121. Monsanto Co. v. Hartkamp, No. 00-164-P, 2001 WL 34079482, at *1 (E.D. 
Okla. Apr. 19, 2001). 
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The case cited in Monsanto vs. U.S. Farmers wherein it is hardest to ab-
solutely rule out inadvertent infringement is Monsanto Co. v. Eaton.122  The 
report suggests that the widespread presence of unauthorized Roundup Ready 
soybeans in Eaton’s field was likely caused by “crop volunteers,” i.e., plants 
in a field resulting from “seed that has not been deliberately sown; typically 
seeds that failed to germinate in the previous season or that fall from a plant 
prior to harvest.”123  It is true that the district court, on a motion for summary 
judgment filed by Monsanto, could not rule out the possibility that a jury 
might find that the high level of patented plants found in Eaton’s fields were 
“crop volunteers.”124  But the judge also pointed out that some of the asser-
tions made by the defendant were “not quite accurate,” or “not completely 
accurate.”125  Although the judge found it possible that a jury might not nec-
essarily conclude that the infringement was caused by Eaton intentionally 
planting patented seeds, the court explicitly acknowledged that “this is an 
extremely close call.” 126  For example, the court noted that the defendant’s 
own expert witness had testified that in his opinion, “[T]o a reasonable degree 
of scientific certainty, the appearance of ‘volunteers’ in defendant’s field was 
‘extremely unlikely to account’ for the extensive presence of Roundup Ready 
soybeans in the farmer’s fields.”127  And while Eaton alleged that he had 
sprayed his fields with non-glyphosate herbicide, Monsanto made specific 
allegations that Eaton had purchased Roundup that year, implying that he in 
fact did use glyphosate.128  On motion for summary judgment, the judge did 
not have to decide this factual dispute, and ultimately the case settled before 
trial.129 
It seems reasonable to assume that CFS is unaware of any more recent 
cases involving a plausible claim of inadvertent infringement, since the only 
examples it could provide in its 2013 amicus brief were those referenced in 
the 2005 Monsanto vs. U.S. Farmers report.  Furthermore, there would seem 
to be a number of excellent lawyers eager to challenge Monsanto’s assertion 
of patents against farmers, including both Professor Mark Lemley of Stan-
ford, who argued before the Federal Circuit on behalf of the accused farmer 
in Monsanto Co. v. McFarling,130 or the attorneys at PubPat.  If a case clearly 
presenting a plausible argument of inadvertent infringement was to present 
itself, would not one of these attorneys jump at the opportunity to pursue the 
case to the appellate level? 
 
 122. Monsanto Co. v. Eaton, No. 4:00-CV-00435 (E.D. Mo. July 6, 2001). 
 123. Monsanto vs. U.S. Farmers, supra note 116, at 4. 
 124. Eaton, No. 4:00-CV-00435, slip op. at 19–20. 
 125. Id., slip op. at 15. 
 126. Id., slip op. at 19 n.13. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id., slip op. at 9–10. 
 129. Monsanto vs. U.S. Farmers, supra note 116, at 42. 
 130. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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VI.  AN INCREASING LIKELIHOOD OF ACTUAL LAWSUITS INVOLVING 
INADVERTENT INFRINGEMENT 
The dearth of lawsuits against inadvertently infringing farmers might be 
attributable, at least in part, to discretion and forbearance on the part of Mon-
santo.  For its part, Monsanto has publicly committed “to [never] exercise its 
patent rights where trace amounts of [its] patented seeds or traits are present 
in a farmer’s field as a result of inadvertent means.”131  This commitment 
played a pivotal role in the Federal Circuit’s decision to dismiss Organic 
Seed Growers due to the plaintiff’s lack of standing, with the court finding 
that Monsanto is bound by the commitment as a matter of judicial estoppel.132  
Still, Monsanto’s stated commitment only extends to “trace” levels of con-
tamination, and at this point it is unclear what level of contamination would 
be deemed by Monsanto to exceed trace levels, and how Monsanto might 
respond to inadvertent infringement that it believes exceeds that threshold.  In 
Organic Seed Growers, the Federal Circuit pointedly noted that during oral 
argument, “Monsanto’s counsel was quite careful never to represent that 
Monsanto would forgo suit against a grower who harvested and replanted 
windblown seeds—even if that grower gained no advantage by doing so” – 
for example, by a farmer that does not spray herbicide on a patented, herbi-
cide resistant crop inadvertently growing on the farmer’s field.133 
The nature of the patented trait that has been the subject of all of Mon-
santo’s enforcement actions to date has likely played a role in this regard.  
After reviewing the numerous lawsuits filed by Monsanto against farmers 
that have resulted in a decision reported on Westlaw,134 I have been unable to 
identify a single one that did not involve an allegation that a farmer had illic-
itly planted seeds containing the Roundup Ready trait.  The reason this is 
significant is that the value of Roundup Ready only manifests itself when the 
farmer performs the overt act of spraying his fields with glyphosate – i.e., 
Roundup – which, in the absence of the Roundup Ready trait, would kill his 
crops.135  It would be irrational for a farmer to spray glyphosate on his field 
of soybeans unless he knows that at least a substantial percentage of those 
soybeans bear the Roundup Ready trait.  Moreover, if it can be shown that a 
farmer has sprayed his crops with glyphosate, it becomes difficult for him to 
persuasively argue that he was not aware he was infringing, and indeed, that 
infringement was not his desired objective. 
 
 131. Monsanto’s Commitment: Farmers and Patents, MONSANTO, http://www.
monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/commitment-farmers-patents.aspx (last visited July 
12, 2015). 
 132. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1358 
(Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 133. Id. at 1359 n.6. 
 134. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra note 7 (Glyphosate is a broad spectrum herbicide and is as toxic to 
non-Roundup Ready soybeans as it is to weeds). 
23
Holman: Bowman v. Monsanto Co.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
688 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
The situation, however, might become more complicated in the not too 
distant future as advances in technology and developments in the market ren-
der it increasingly likely that infringement lawsuits will be filed in cases 
where it is more difficult to prove that a farmer has taken overt action unam-
biguously establishing the intentional use of patented technology, or even 
knowledge that a patented plant is growing in the farmer’s field.  Various 
factors that increase the likelihood of a lawsuit under circumstances of inad-
vertent infringement, or at least in which it seems plausible that the infringe-
ment was inadvertent, are discussed in this Part. 
A.  “Generic” Roundup Ready 
One factor that could lead to lawsuits against arguably inadvertently in-
fringing farmers is the imminent expiration of the patents on the Roundup 
Ready trait in soybeans and the anticipated commercialization of “generic” 
Roundup Ready seeds.  Monsanto’s patents covering the original Roundup 
Ready trait – now referred to as “first-generation Roundup Ready,” or 
“Roundup Ready 1” – will expire by 2015, ending Monsanto’s legal right to 
exclusivity.136  The company has already developed and released a next-
generation glyphosate tolerance trait, which it markets as Roundup Ready 
2.137  However, Monsanto is also cooperating with non-Monsanto seed devel-
opers in order to make it possible for them to incorporate the first-generation 
Roundup Ready trait into their seeds, which will not be covered by any active 
Monsanto patent.138  In effect, for the first time, generic versions of a genet-
ically modified crop could become available to farmers. 
If generic Roundup Ready seeds do enter the market, they will coexist 
with Monsanto’s Roundup Ready 2, which is covered by its own patents.139  
Under this scenario glyphosate-tolerance will no longer equate with patented 
technology, and a farmer found to have cultivated seeds containing patented 
Roundup Ready 2 seeds, perhaps obtained as commodity seed from a local 
grain elevator, might plausibly argue that he only sought to take advantage of 
generic Roundup Ready and did not intend to benefit from any inadvertent, 
and arguably unavoidable, presence of Roundup Ready 2-containing seeds in 
his field. 
 
 136. Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Expiration, MONSANTO, http://www.
monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/roundup-ready-patent-expiration.aspx (last visited 
July 12, 2015). 
 137. Genuity Roundup Ready 2 Yield Soybeans: More Beans Per Pod, More 
Bushels Per Acre, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/products/pages/genuity-
roundup-ready-2-yield-soybeans.aspx (last visited July 12, 2015). 
 138. American Seed Trade Ass’n and Biotech. Indus. Org., The Accord: Generic 
Event Marketability and Access Agreement is Open for Signature (Oct. 31, 2012), 
http://www.agaccord.org/include/facts.pdf. 
 139. Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Expiration: Commitments, MONSANTO, 
http://www.soybeans.com/commitments.aspx (last visited July 12, 2015). 
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B.  Passively Beneficial Traits 
A second factor that could lead to inadvertent infringement lawsuits will 
be the increasing commercialization of patented transgenic traits that do not 
require a farmer to take any overt action to experience the benefit of the tech-
nology, such as insect resistance and drought tolerance.  This will render it 
more difficult to prove that a farmer has intentionally used and benefited 
from the patented technology.140  Although insect resistant soybeans are cur-
rently not commercially available in the United States, Dow AgroSciences 
recently reported U.S. approval of an insect resistant trait comprising two 
genes providing insect resistance,141 and Monsanto is currently exploring 
“how [insect resistant] soybeans could fit into the U.S. agricultural land-
scape.”142  A farmer found to be infringing a patent on such a trait by using 
commodity grain as seed, for example, might argue that he was simply trying 
to save money by obtaining a cheap source of seed and had no intention of 
using the patented technology built into the seed.  In fact, the farmer could 
argue that the patentee’s own actions had rendered infringement unavoidable 
by encouraging neighboring farmers to adopt the patented technology, effec-
tively pushing the technology into the local grain elevators. 
C.  Trait Stacking 
The first genetically modified crops contained a single trait, e.g., 
glyphosate tolerance or insect resistance.143  But as the market matured, seed 
companies began to develop more and more seeds containing stacked traits, 
i.e., multiple patented genetic modifications incorporated into the same 
seed.144  One vision for the future of the seed industry is that seed developers 
will license in a variety of traits, perhaps patented and licensed by different 
firms, and farmers will be able to choose seeds incorporating the combination 
of traits that best suits their needs.145  Some of the traits might be off-patent 
like Roundup Ready 1. 
 
 140. Plant Biotechnology Pipeline, CROPLIFE INT’L (June 2014), 
http://croplife.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Plant-Biotech-Pipeline-2014.pdf. 
 141. Rich Keller, Dow Two-Bt Soybean Insect-Resistant Trait Approved, AG 
PROFESSIONAL (May 1, 2014), http://www.agprofessional.com/news/Dow-two-Bt-
soybean-insect-resistant-trait-approved-257548091.html. 
 142. Emily Unglesbee, Soybeans: Monsanto Assessing Fit of Bt Varieties in U.S. 
— DTN, AGFAX (Sept. 6, 2014), http://agfax.com/2014/03/05/soybeans-monsanto-
assessing-fit-bt-varieties-u-s-dtn/#sthash.JqgD3OUE.dpuf. 
 143. Natasha Gilbert, Case Studies: A Hard Look at GM Crops, NATURE (May 1, 
2013), http://www.nature.com/news/case-studies-a-hard-look-at-gm-crops-1.12907. 
 144. Sorting Out the Facts Behind Stacks, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto
.com/newsviews/Pages/gene-stacks-facts.aspx#q9 (last visited July 12, 2015). 
 145. Id.  Also my personal communications with management of agricultural 
biotechnology companies. 
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The result could be an increasingly heterogeneous seed population, with 
some farmers growing non-GMO crops, others using seeds containing only 
off-patent traits, and the rest using seeds incorporating one or more patented 
traits, possibly in combination with non-patented generic traits.  Unless grain 
elevator operators start sequestering the seeds based on the presence of traits, 
which will become increasingly infeasible as the heterogeneity increases, 
commodity seeds will represent a collection of patented and non-patented 
traits.  It will become impossible for a farmer to purchase commodity seeds 
without inadvertently having some percentage comprising a variety of patent-
ed traits, perhaps with the patents owned by different patent owners. 
D.  Planting of Commodity Grain 
Another factor that might contribute to an increased likelihood of a law-
suit based on possibly inadvertent infringement would be if farmers begin to 
make greater use of commodity grain as a source of seed.  This is what 
Bowman did that resulted in his infringement of Monsanto’s patents, illustrat-
ing that such a practice is at least feasible for farmers.146  Bowman clearly 
knew and benefited from the presence of the patented Roundup Ready trait in 
the commodity soybeans he planted, but one can imagine scenarios in which 
a farmer using commodity grain as an inexpensive source of seed might not 
realize that the seed contains patented traits, and have no intent to benefit 
from the presence of the patented traits.  This becomes more likely as more 
traits are stacked into plants, particularly traits that are not patented or that do 
not require any overt action, such as the application of herbicide to benefit 
from the trait.147 
Some would argue that a farmer who plants commodity grain is simply 
engaging in a practice that has long been in the public domain. But if the use 
of patented GM technology becomes very prevalent, as a practical matter it 
could become very difficult, if not impossible, to purchase commodity or 
saved seed that does not contain the patented technology.  As a consequence, 
a farmer might know that patented technology is in the seeds, but, with no 
desire or intention to use the technology, plausibly argue that any infringe-
ment that occurs is inadvertent and unavoidable.  This might particularly be 
the case if the patented trait is one which does not require an overt act by the 
farmer evidencing the fact that the farmer is aware of, and actively seeks to 
benefit from, the technology. 
The extent to which inadvertent infringement based on the planting of 
commodity grain will become a problem depends upon the extent to which 
farmers actually engage in the practice.  Amicus briefs filed with the Supreme 
Court in Bowman reveal a division of opinion on this point.  For his part, 
Bowman argued that the use of commodity grain constituted an important 
 
 146. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1763 (2013). 
 147. See supra Part VII.B–C. 
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traditional farming practice that “growers have done for generations.”148  But 
according to a number of amici who filed briefs with the Supreme Court in 
support of Monsanto, including organizations representing grain elevator 
operators, mainstream farmers, and seed companies, the planting of commod-
ity seeds is in fact not a practice engaged in by the vast majority of farm-
ers.149 
CHS Inc., for example, a farmer-owned cooperative whose operations 
comprise an integrated network of elevators, marketing offices, and export 
terminals, argued in its amicus brief that the use of commodity grain as seed 
is neither a traditional nor a common practice among farmers, largely because 
commodity grain is inferior to the seed farmers normally purchase from 
commercial vendors.150  An amicus brief filed on behalf of growers of soy-
beans, corn, wheat, and sugar beets echoed the point that the planting of 
commodity grain is an unorthodox practice fraught with risk due to the lack 
of verification or certification with respect to germination rate or seed maturi-
ty, along with the potential for contamination by crop residue, foreign matter, 
and weed seeds – “the soybean’s natural enemy.”151  Another amicus, seed 
developer Pioneer Hi-Bred, argued that Bowman’s planting of commodity 
seed violated a variety of state and federal laws, including the Plant Variety 
Protection Act.152  Bowman himself acknowledged that “the use of commodi-
ty grain as seed is occasional,” admitting that commodity seeds will generally 
result in a significantly smaller yield, due to factors such as lack of uniformi-
ty in maturity, decreased disease resistance, and the absence of other benefi-
cial traits typically provided in commercially supplied seeds.153 
Still, Monsanto apparently deemed Bowman’s unauthorized planting of 
commodity seed of sufficient commercial significance to warrant the filing of 
a lawsuit, which suggests that the potential for inadvertent infringement based 
on the planting of commodity grain is not an issue so insubstantial that it can 
be dismissed out of hand.  Indeed, in its brief, CHS Inc. argued that if the 
Supreme Court had ruled in favor of Bowman, it could encourage other farm-
ers to adopt the practice on a larger scale, which would in turn “disincentive 
innovators from investing in the development of new genetically enhanced 
seed.”154 
Furthermore, even if the planting of commodity grain is not a common 
practice today, the widespread adoption of GM technology could be increas-
ing the incentives in favor of commodity seed planting.  For example, genetic 
 
 148. Brief of Defendant-Appellant Vernon Hugh Bowman, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 
1761 (No. 11–796), 2011 WL 882003, at *6. 
 149. See, e.g., Brief for American Soybean Ass’n et al., supra note 55, at *31. 
 150. Brief for Amicus Curiae CHS Inc. in Support of Respondents, Bowman, 133 
S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11–796), 2013 WL 315222, *2. 
 151. See Brief for American Soybean Ass’n et al., supra note 55. 
 152. Brief for Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respond-
ents, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11–796), 2013 WL 315224. 
 153. Brief of Defendant-Appellant Vernon Hugh Bowman, supra note 148 at *6. 
 154. See Brief for Amicus Curiae CHS Inc., supra note 150, at *3. 
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modification has dramatically increased the value of soybeans for use as seed 
relative to their value for use as food or fodder.  Seed companies are able to 
charge a great deal more for the seed than they could in the past, but farmers 
are not able to charge more for the resulting commodity grain sold for use as 
food.  As a result, the disparity in price between soybeans sold as seed versus 
soybeans sold as food continues to increase.  The greater this price differen-
tial, the more incentive a farmer will have to buy commodity grain priced for 
sale as food, and then take advantage of its high value for use as seed by 
planting it. 
Another scenario that could incentivize commodity seed planting would 
be if we arrive at a point where farmers do not perceive a great differential in 
value between the latest patented trait and earlier versions of the trait that 
have gone off-patent.  For example, farmers could decide that there is insuffi-
cient additional value present in the next-generation Roundup Ready 2 prod-
uct to warrant the price differential and choose to use generic Roundup Ready 
1 products instead.  If a substantial number of neighboring farmers are using 
generic Roundup Ready 1, a farmer might plausibly argue that he is planting 
commodity seed in the expectation that it will contain the generic Roundup 
Ready trait rather than patented Roundup Ready 2. 
VII.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF INADVERTENT 
INFRINGEMENT WOULD DENY SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES 
EFFECTIVE PATENT PROTECTION 
The belief that patents on self-replicating technologies will lead to inad-
vertent infringement has generated a number of proposals that would address 
the perceived problem in a manner that threatens to dramatically undercut the 
ability of the patent system to incentivize innovation in fields that generate 
self-replicating products, such as biotechnology, nanotechnology, and per-
haps even software.  Some of these proposals are described in this Part. 
A.  Patent Exhaustion 
In Bowman v. Monsanto Co., the infringing farmer and a number of 
supporting amici urged the Court to extend the judge-made doctrine of patent 
exhaustion to cover second-generation progeny of patented seeds, arguing 
that such an extension is necessary in order to shield farmers from liability for 
inadvertent infringement.155  By implication, this extension of the exhaustion 
doctrine might well be applied to other self-replicating technologies outside 
the realm of plants and living organisms.156  The Supreme Court declined this 
invitation to extend the doctrine, based on the facts of the case which includ-
ed unquestioned intentional and knowing infringement on the part of Bow-
man, but the Court emphasized that it was not addressing every situation “in-
 
 155. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1768. 
 156. Supra Part III. 
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volving a self-replicating product,” and noted that “[i]n another case, the arti-
cle’s self-replication might occur outside the purchaser’s control [or] might 
be a necessary but incidental step in using the item for another purpose.”157  
Were the courts to extend patent exhaustion to encompass progeny of self-
replicating products like seeds, perhaps in a case featuring a more sympathet-
ic accused infringer, it could have severe negative implications for a variety 
of self-replicating technologies. 
B.  Patent Ineligibility 
Several years ago, the Federal Circuit’s Judge Gajarsa wrote a concur-
ring opinion in SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex opining that “products capable 
of being ‘reproduced by nature unaided by man,’ are not [patent eligible],” 
based upon his concerns about the potential for inadvertent infringement.158  
The specific example he gave was a hypothetical genetically modified “blue 
corn.”159  He predicted that patents on technologies having the potential to 
replicate without active human involvement could lead to “a widespread in 
terrorem effect crippling entire industries whose artisans learn that even their 
best efforts to respect patent rights may not save them from liability as inad-
vertent, inevitable infringers.”160  While Judge Gajarsa’s position with respect 
to the patent eligibility of seeds seems inconsistent with Supreme Court prec-
edent, such as Chakrabarty161 and J.E.M. Ag,162 it does illustrate the suscepti-
bility of even a Federal Circuit judge to reach for dramatic restrictions on the 
availability of patent protection based on perceived potential policy concerns 
associated with inadvertent infringement.  Such an approach, which would 
effectively exclude even the most inventive and useful self-replicating prod-
ucts from patent protection, could have profoundly negative implications for 
innovation. 
C.  Lack of Moral Utility 
In Organic Seed Growers, organizations representing organic farmers 
asked the courts to declare a number of Monsanto’s patents relating to genet-
ically modified crop plants invalid under the doctrine of moral utility, alleg-
ing that the problems caused by inadvertent infringement rendered the 
claimed subject matter “injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound 
 
 157. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769. 
 158. SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 365 F.3d 1306, 1330–32 (Fed. Cir. 2004), 
opinion vacated on reh’g en banc, 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005), superseded, 403 
F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005), aff’d on other grounds, 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 1333. 
 161. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 162. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
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morals of society.”163  Monsanto prevailed based on the plaintiff’s inability to 
establish standing, but the court implied that plaintiffs might have standing to 
proceed with their case if they could establish a reasonable likelihood that a 
farmer might “accumulate greater than trace amounts of modified seed by 
using or selling contaminated seed from his fields.”164 
The doctrine of moral utility, which was at one time a viable theory for 
invalidating certain patents associated with activities deemed immoral or 
illegal, is generally believed to be of little relevance under recent Federal 
Circuit decisions that appear to have rejected the idea that the patent system 
plays a role in policing morality.165  However, the doctrine is based on lan-
guage from Supreme Court decisions, and it is not inconceivable that, if pre-
sented with the right set of facts, the Supreme Court might revive the doc-
trine.  We have seen this phenomenon repeatedly in recent years, most nota-
bly with respect to the patent eligibility doctrine, which the Federal Circuit 
attempted to cabin but which was revived by the modern Supreme Court.166 
D.  Duty on Patent Owner to Prevent Inadvertent Infringement 
Bowman and some of his supporting amici suggested that the law 
should impose a duty on patent owners, like Monsanto, to take affirmative 
steps to prevent the occurrence of inadvertent infringement, arguing, for ex-
ample, that Monsanto should have been required to impose contractual re-
straints on authorized users of the technology which required the labeling and 
sequestration of patented second-generation progeny seeds.167  Bowman also 
argued that Monsanto should have required licensed users of the company’s 
technology “to sell their patented grain to preapproved grain dealers who 
would keep Monsanto’s patented traits separate and agree not to sell to farm-
ers who refused to sign a No Plant Agreement.”168  He argued that these 
measures were necessary in order to allow farmers to continue using com-
modity grain as an alternative source of seed, and that if Monsanto chose to 
enforce its patents in a manner that effectively precludes the planting of 
 
 163. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1354 
(Fed. Cir. 2013); see Complaint, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto 
Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544, (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2011) (No. 11CV02163), 2011 WL 
1126563. 
 164. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1359. 
 165. See, e.g., Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 292 F.3d 728 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
 166. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. 
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 167. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Mon-
santo Co. v. Bowman 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836–37 (S.D. Ind. 2009); see also Brief 
for Knowledge Ecology Int’l, supra note 50, at *13 n.2. 
 168. Brief of Defendant-Appellant Vernon Hugh Bowman, supra note 148, at 
*34. 
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commodity grain, then the law should require the company to ensure the 
maintenance of an accessible source of non-patented commodity grain for 
farmers.169 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 287(a), a patent owner may only recover damages for 
patent infringement if the owner provides constructive notice by marking the 
patented article, or its package, with applicable patent numbers, or, in the 
alternative, after providing actual notice to the accused infringer.170  Pointing 
to this statutory provision, Bowman argued that it would be easy for Monsan-
to to require growers to inform their purchasers – i.e., grain elevators – of the 
presence of patented Monsanto seeds by means of “appropriate labels placed 
on seed bags,” and that in the absence of such explicit labeling, any purchaser 
of unlabeled patented seed should be immune from the imposition of any 
damages for infringement.171 
This marking requirement argument was left unresolved in Bowman, as 
the Federal Circuit held the argument moot, given that Monsanto had provid-
ed actual notice to Bowman of his infringement.172  But if a court were to be 
presented with a case involving a farmer who planted unlabeled seeds without 
actual notice, it seems likely that the court would side with the patent owner 
on the question of damages.  When a party other than the patentee is selling 
or making a patented article, such as a farmer selling commodity grain, courts 
use a “rule of reason” to determine whether the statutory requirement has 
been met.173  In Bowman, Monsanto argued that it had substantially complied 
with the constructive notice provision of Section 287 by marking, and requir-
ing its “seed partners” to mark, all first-generation seeds that contain patented 
Monsanto technology, and that under the Federal Circuit’s rule of reason, it 
had no obligation under the statute to compel farmers to mark their commodi-
ty seeds because there is normally nothing for them to mark.174  According to 
Monsanto, growers normally do not place their soybeans in bags or other 
 
 169. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1348–49; Bowman 686 F. Supp. 2d at 836–37. 
 170. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2012). 
 171. Brief of Defendant-Appellant Vernon Hugh Bowman, supra note 148, at 
*36. 
 172. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1349. 
 173. Funai Elec. Co. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 616 F.3d 1357, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (upholding jury finding of constructive notice, under a rule of reason, where 
patentee properly marked all articles patentee sold under its own brand, even though a 
third-party failed to mark any patented articles the third-party sold as Original 
Equipment Manufacturers); Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 
U.S. 387, 398 (1936) (the marking statute “requires nothing unreasonable of patent-
ees”); Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U.S. 29, 50 (1892) (“[S]omething must be left to the 
judgment of the patentee” when the practicability of marking the article itself is a 
“doubtful case[.]”). 
 174. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees Monsanto Company and Monsanto Technolo-
gy LLC, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2012) (No. 2010-1068), 2011 
WL 1748629, at *45. 
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containers capable of being marked unless engaged in brownbag sales of ille-
gal seeds.175 
Bowman and some of his amici also suggested that patent owners 
should be required to develop and employ technical solutions to address the 
problem of inadvertent infringement.  In particular, Bowman asserted that 
equities required Monsanto to use the so-called “Terminator gene” to render 
second-generation seeds infertile, thereby obviating the threat of inadvertent 
infringement.176  Similarly, Knowledge Ecology International filed an amicus 
brief in support of Bowman, arguing that “Monsanto could stack its genet-
ically modified seed with a ‘Terminator gene’ that renders subsequent genera-
tions of seed sterile.”177  These assertions seem disingenuous given the de 
facto moratorium on the technology,178 and the district court appropriately 
dismissed the argument, pointing to the absence of evidence on the record 
that the Terminator gene was available, and noting that in any event the court 
is not the appropriate venue for raising such a policy argument.179 
While self-help measures such as sequestration, labeling, and technolog-
ical restrictions on copying might in some instances be a prudent approach 
for companies like Monsanto, they should not be compulsory, and the failure 
of a patent owner to take such steps should not cause the loss of patent rights.  
At least as a general matter, requiring patent owners to take positive steps to 
prevent infringement can be seen as contrary to established principles of law.  
“As a general rule, the law imposes no duty on one person actively to assist in 
the preservation of the . . . property of another . . . even though the means by 
which the harm can be averted are in his possession.”180  And as a matter of 
policy, there are advantages to the use of patents as the primary means to 
protect new technologies.  Unlike technological restrictions on access, patents 
eventually expire, and even while they are in force, they do not preclude all 
third-party use of the covered technology, particularly in the context of basic 
research. 
E.  Compulsory Licensing 
The policy concerns associated with patented self-replicating products 
has also led to proposals for federal legislation that would limit the rights of 
patent owners.  For example, Representative Kaptur (D-OH) recently intro-
duced the Seed Availability and Competition Act of 2013, which would in 
effect create a system of compulsory licensing for the second-generation 
 
 175. Id. at *45–46. 
 176. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 (S.D. Ind. 2009). 
 177. Brief for Knowledge Ecology Int’l supra note 50, at 13 n.2. 
 178. See infra note 300 and accompanying text. 
 179. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 837. 
 180. Sidwell v. McVay, 282 P.2d 756, 759 (Okla. 1955); see also Louisville & 
N.R. Co. v. Scruggs & Echols, 49 So. 399, 400 (Ala. 1909) (“The law imposes no 
duty on one man to aid another in the preservation of the latter’s property.”). 
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progeny of patented seeds.181  Under the proposed system, any farmer wish-
ing to retain seeds harvested from the planting of patented seeds would pay a 
fee set by the Secretary of Agriculture, and would then be free of any contrac-
tual limitation on retaining the seed previously set by the biotechnology com-
pany.182  The fee would go into a Patented Seed Fund, which would later be 
distributed by the Secretary of Agriculture to the patent holders.183 
In a press release, the communication director for the bill’s sponsor stat-
ed, “Rep. Kaptur has concerns about the ability of corporations to obtain pa-
tents on self-replicating articles, such as seeds and human DNA, allowing 
patent holders to claim property rights in perpetuity.”184  He went on to note, 
however, that “Rep. Kaptur recognized the importance of protecting intellec-
tual property and wanted to avoid the constitutional issues that would arise 
from attempting to nullify patent rights.”185  He also explained that the pro-
posed “system places the Department of Agriculture as an intermediary, giv-
ing it the discretion to set fees and apportion them to the companies ‘fairly,’ 
while leaving companies like Monsanto out of the payment process.”186 
VIII.  LEVERAGING EXISTING DOCTRINE TO ADDRESS INADVERTENT 
INFRINGEMENT WHILE MAINTAINING THE INCENTIVE TO INNOVATE 
The proposals outlined in the previous Part could have dramatic nega-
tive impact on the incentives for innovation in self-replicating technologies.  
In fact, drastic approaches of this type are probably unnecessary, since courts 
already have at their disposal a variety of existing doctrines of patent law that 
could be implemented in a manner that effectively shields an inadvertent in-
fringer from liability without unduly eviscerating patent protection for devel-
opers of self-replicating technologies.  Some of these approaches are dis-
cussed in this Part. 
A.  A Restricted Interpretation of What It Means to Make, Use, Or Sell 
a Self-Replicating Technology 
It is often assumed that a standard of strict liability applies to direct pa-
tent infringement, and thus, that any farmer found to have patented plants 
growing in his fields will necessarily be subject to liability for patent in-
fringement.  This assumption appears throughout much of the academic 
commentary on inadvertent infringement, and was at the heart of the Organic 
 
 181. Seed Availability and Competition Act of 2013, H.R. 193 (introduced Jan. 4, 
2013), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr193/summary. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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Seed Growers lawsuit.187  In fact, however, it is a mistake to assume that the 
presence of patented material on a field necessarily constitutes patent in-
fringement.  Direct infringement is defined by the statute, which specifies that 
a patent is infringed by one who makes, uses, sells, offers for sale, or imports 
patented subject matter.188  Significantly, it is well established that mere pos-
session of patented technology does not constitute patent infringement.189 
In the context of patent infringement, “making,” “using,” and “selling” 
are terms of art subject to judicial interpretation.190  The statute itself provides 
no definition for the terms, and the legislative history is not particularly en-
lightening.191  In fact, the case law is relatively sparse with respect to how 
these terms are to be interpreted, but the courts have noted that the term 
“use,” for example, has never been construed in a manner that reaches the 
broadest interpretation one might ascribe to it.192  Although the Supreme 
Court rejected Bowman’s arguments that he had not made or used the patent-
ed technology,193 Bowman was, by his own admission, not an inadvertent 
infringer, and the door remains open for the court to interpret “making, using, 
and selling” in a manner that would shield inadvertent infringers from liabil-
ity.194 
 
 187. See generally Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 
F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 188. 35 U.S.C § 271 (2012).  With respect to the potentially infringing activities 
of farmers, the most applicable of the five statutory infringing activities would seem 
to be “making, using, and selling,” so this article will focus on these three and forgo 
discussion of importation and offering for sale.  See id. 
 189. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n v. RB Sandrini, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-
00842OWWTAG, 2007 WL 1847631, at *18 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2007); L.A. Gear 
Inc. v. E.S. Originals Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1294, 1298 (C.D. Calif. 1994). 
 190. Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
 191. See Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 16 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Congress has never deemed it necessary to define any of this triad 
of excludable activities, . . . leaving instead the meaning of ‘make,’ ‘use,’ and ‘sell’ 
for judicial interpretation.”). 
 192. Roche Products, Inc., 733 F.2d at 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Although few cases 
discuss the question of whether a particular use constitutes an infringing use of a 
patented invention, they nevertheless convincingly lead to the conclusion that the 
word ‘use’ in section 271(a) has never been taken to its utmost possible scope.”); see 
also Quantum Group Inc. v. Am. Sensor Inc., No. 96 C 0761, 1998 WL 766707, at *6 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1998) (“On its face, § 271(a) prohibits any and all uses of a patent-
ed invention.  However, the term has never been taken to its utmost possible scope.”). 
 193. Bowman v. Monsanto, 134 S. Ct. 1761, 1763 (2013). 
 194. Id. at 1769. 
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1.  Courts Are Willing and Able to Interpret Statutory Language in a 
Restricted Manner 
A restricted judicial interpretation of “make, use, and sell” that would 
shield a truly inadvertent infringer from liability is not at all unlikely, particu-
larly if the court believes that doing so would comport with the overall con-
gressional and constitutional purpose and policy underlying the patent statute.  
There is ample precedent to support this sort of judicial activism.  For exam-
ple, consider how the courts have imposed restricted interpretations on forms 
of the word “use” as it is construed for the purposes of anticipation under 35 
U.S.C. § 102. 
Prior to the enactment of the America Invents Act (“AIA”) in 2011, 35 
U.S.C. § 102(a) specified that a patent shall not be awarded if, prior to the 
date of invention, the claimed invention was “known or used” by others.195  
As interpreted by the courts, the term “known or used” is limited to publicly 
available knowledge or use – strictly private knowledge or use is not suffi-
cient to satisfy the statute.196  There is nothing in the language of the statute 
to support this crabbed interpretation, but courts have determined that, in 
order to satisfy public policy concerns and to comport with the overall inten-
tion of the statute, this narrower interpretation should be applied to the word 
“use” as used in this context. 197 
An even more striking example is seen in the manner in which the 
courts have interpreted the term “public use” as it appears in pre-AIA 35 
U.S.C. § 102(b).198  With no explicit basis in the statute, the courts have in-
terpreted “public use” as excluding even highly public uses of a patented 
invention if those uses were for the purpose of experimenting on the inven-
tion.  For example, in the seminal case in this area, City of Elizabeth v. Amer-
ican Nicholson Pavement Co., the invention was a type of pavement that was 
used extensively for years on a public thoroughfare.199  Nonetheless, because 
the Supreme Court viewed this use as a form of experimentation, it was held 
not to constitute “public use” within the meaning of the statute.200  Converse-
ly, courts have held that the commercial use of a patented invention by the 
inventor constitutes “public use” under the statute, even if that use is kept 
entirely secret and there is no way for the public to discern the nature of the 
invention from the activities.201 
 
 195. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 196. See Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc. 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998); In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 878 (C.C.P.A. 1966); In re Borst, 345 F.2d 
851 (C.C.P.A. 1965). 
 197. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 194 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed. 2013). 
 198. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 199. City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135 (1878). 
 200. Id. at 133–34. 
 201. Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 
519–20 (2d Cir. 1946); see also Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America 
Invents Act and Its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 40–45 (2012). 
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Outside the context of patent law, the Supreme Court has stressed the 
importance of interpreting words such as “use” and “utilize” in a way that 
comports with how people normally use the terms, and in a manner consistent 
with the intent of Congress and the overall purpose of the statute.  For exam-
ple, in Watson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that “[w]ith no statu-
tory definition or definitive clue, the meaning of the verb ‘uses’ has to turn on 
the language as we normally speak it,” and should strike “the ear as ‘both 
reasonable and normal.’”202  In Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, the 
question before the Supreme Court was whether the Justice Department’s use 
of an ABA committee to evaluate the qualifications of nominees for federal 
judgeships constituted “utilization” of the committee.203  After acknowledg-
ing that “read unqualifiedly,” the verb “utilize” would accurately describe the 
Justice Department’s use of the committee, the Court proceeded to interpret 
the term in a manner excluding such use.204  The Court justified its narrow 
interpretation of the term by inferring that “Congress did not intend that the 
term ‘utilized’ apply to the Justice Department’s use of the ABA Commit-
tee.”205 
2.  Intent and Knowledge 
It is generally assumed that “an infringement may be entirely inadvert-
ent and unintentional and without the knowledge of the patent.”206  However, 
the matter is not nearly so clear-cut and settled as is so often assumed, as 
illustrated by an interesting “Works in Progress” article by Saurabh Vishnub-
hakat that “challenges the axiom of U.S. patent law that direct patent in-
fringement is a strict liability tort.” 207  The patent statute is silent with respect 
to the role of intent and knowledge in direct infringement, and in my view, it 
would be within the power of the courts to introduce some requirement of 
intent and/or knowledge, at least in the context of certain alleged acts of in-
fringement involving self-replicating technologies.  Although this would be a 
marked departure from mainstream patent jurisprudence, there is ample prec-
edent for this sort of doctrinal evolution to be found in judicial interpretations 
of indirect patent infringement and copyright infringement. 
 
 202. Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 79 (2007). 
 203. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 448 (1989). 
 204. Id. at 452. 
 205. Id. at 441. 
 206. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02[2] at 16-3 1 (2000) (“It is, 
of course, elementary, that an infringement may be entirely inadvertent and uninten-
tional and without knowledge of the patent.”); see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645, 654 n.5 (1999) (“Ac-
tions predicated on direct patent infringement . . . do not require any showing of intent 
to infringe; instead, knowledge and intent are considered only with respect to damag-
es.”); Jurgens v. CBK, 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 207. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, A Relevant Intent Theory of Patents, http://www.law.
berkeley.edu/files/Vishnubhakat_Saurabh_IPSC_paper_2014.pdf. 
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For example, although the statutory provision that covers contributory 
patent infringement recites an element of knowledge, it does not explicitly 
specify whether knowledge of the infringed patent is required for liability.208  
Nonetheless, as acknowledged by the Federal Circuit in 1990, 
Although not clear on the face of the statute, subsequent case law held 
that [35 U.S.C.] § 271(c) [the statutory provision relating to contribu-
tory infringement] required not only knowledge that the component 
was especially made or adapted for a particular use but also 
knowledge of the patent which proscribed that use.209 
Section 271(b), the statutory basis for induced patented infringement, is 
silent on the question of knowledge.  For years, the courts have struggled to 
define the level of intent necessary to establish liability for this form of indi-
rect infringement.  In 1974, for example, a district court judge stated that he 
was “inclined toward the view that an inducement under § 271(b), like a di-
rect infringement under § 271(a), does not require a specific intent.”210  In 
1990, however, this view was rejected in a Federal Circuit opinion holding 
that although “[o]n its face, § 271(b) . . .  certainly does not speak of any in-
tent requirement to prove active inducement, . . . we are of the opinion that 
proof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a 
necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement.”211  Still, the role of in-
tent in induced patent infringement remained unresolved in 2004, when a 
Federal Circuit panel acknowledged a “lack of clarity” on the intent requisite 
for inducement liability.212  In 2010, the Federal Circuit held that a party can 
be liable for inducing infringement, despite having no actual knowledge of 
the infringed patent, so long as the party “deliberately disregard[s] a known 
risk” that the induced acts are infringing.213  On appeal, this aspect of the 
decision was overruled by the Supreme Court, which held in Global-Tech 
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. that deliberate disregard is insufficient to estab-
lish actual knowledge, but that willful blindness can constitute actual 
knowledge. 214 
Copyright law also provides some relevant precedent with regard to the 
willingness and ability of courts to incorporate an intent element into the def-
inition of infringement in order to address policy concerns caused by the ad-
 
 208. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012). 
 209. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 n.4 (Fed 
Cir. 1990) (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 
488 (1964)). 
 210. Hauni Werke Koerber & Co. v. Molins, Ltd., No. 73-404-R, 1974 WL 
20172, at *5 (E.D. Va. June 11, 1974). 
 211. Hewlett-Packard Co., 909 F.2d at 1469. 
 212. Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
 213. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1377 (2010). 
 214. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070–71 (2011). 
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vance of technology.  Like patent infringement, copyright infringement has 
historically been treated as a strict liability offense, but with the development 
of the Internet, it became difficult for Internet Service Providers to avoid be-
coming unintentional and inadvertent, albeit active, participants in the unau-
thorized posting of copyrighted subject matter.  When presented with this 
issue, a federal district court judge sitting in Silicon Valley ruled in Religious 
Technology Center v. Netcom that, although copyright infringement is gener-
ally treated as a matter of strict liability, it would be poor public policy to 
hold an Internet Service Provider strictly liable under circumstances such as 
this.  For that reason, the court held that liability for this sort of Internet-based 
infringement requires a showing of “some element of volition or causa-
tion.”215  The principle enunciated in Religious Technology Center has gener-
ally been received positively and was largely embraced by Congress in the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act.216 
If courts can modify the rule of strict liability in copyright in order to 
address compelling public policy concerns caused by advances in technology, 
then why not with respect to patent law?  The Supreme Court has noted the 
“historic kinship between patent and copyright law,” and it would not be the 
first time that legal precedent established with respect to one of these forms 
of IP has been later expanded to the other. 217  For example, in Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, the Supreme Court looked to patent law’s definition 
of contributory infringement in crafting the standard for contributory in-
fringement of copyright.218  And in eBay v. Mercexchange, the Supreme 
Court referred to copyright law’s standard for granting an injunction in defin-
ing the standard for permanent injunctions under patent law.219 
In Schmeiser, the Canadian Court of Appeals expressed some openness 
to the infringing farmer’s argument for the incorporation of a knowledge el-
ement into the definition of infringing “use.”220  The court noted that the 
principle that intention is not material to a finding of infringement was “de-
veloped in the context of patents for conventional inventions,” implying that 
the general rule might not necessarily be applicable to non-conventional, i.e., 
self-replicating inventions.221  The court observed that while “[c]learly, in 
most cases of patent infringement, to allow a defense of ignorance or lack of 
 
 215. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 216. RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, BROWN AND DENICOLA’S 
COPYRIGHT: UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND RELATED TOPICS BEARING ON THE 
PROTECTION OF WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP 477 (Foundation Press, 9th ed. 2005) 
(“[DMCA] creates a series of safe harbors generally following along the lines of 
Judge Whyte’s analysis in Netcom.”). 
 217. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
439 (1984) (citing “historic kinship between patent law and copyright law”). 
 218. Id. at 440–42. 
 219. eBay v. Mercexchange, 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006). 
 220. Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser (C.A.) [2003] 2 F.C. 165, para. 56 (Fed. 
Ct.). 
 221. Id. 
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intention to infringe would destroy the efficacy of the patent, [] the patented 
Monsanto gene [arguably] falls into a novel category.”222  The Canadian 
court did not need to resolve the issue, given the ample evidence of 
Schmeiser’s knowledge of infringement.223  The court did, however, 
acknowledge that at some point the law with respect to intent in patent in-
fringement might need to be modified with respect to a patented invention 
found within a living plant that might, without human intervention, produce 
progeny containing the same invention.224 
One interesting aspect of Schmeiser was the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
discussion of the potentially critical role of knowledge in distinguishing be-
tween the mere possession of a patented item – which does not constitute 
infringement – and infringing use of the item.  The court noted that posses-
sion of a patented item, at least under commercial circumstances, can lead to 
a rebuttable presumption of use, but that a lack of knowledge and intent 
could, under some circumstances, assist in rebutting the presumption of use 
arising from possession,225 particularly if the farmer does not avail himself of 
the benefits of the technology.226  This suggests that a defendant farmer could 
potentially rebut any presumption of use by showing that he never intended to 
cultivate plants containing the patented genes and cells. 
The Supreme Court of Canada further suggested that a defendant’s con-
duct on becoming aware of the presence of the patented invention might very 
well assist in rebutting the presumption of use arising from possession.227  A 
farmer might demonstrate that the continued presence of the patented gene on 
their land was accidental and unwelcome, for example, by showing that he 
acted quickly to arrange for its removal, and that the level of contamination 
was consistent with that to be expected from unsolicited “blow-by” seed.228 
3.  Beneficial Use of the Invention 
Another manner in which a court might address the problem of inad-
vertent infringement is by declining to recognize cultivation of a seed as 
“use” or “making” of a patented invention under circumstances where the 
farmer did not actively seek to benefit from the patented technology.  An 
extreme example of this would be a farmer whose fields include patented 
plant material as a consequence of genetic drift, but other scenarios under 
which a farmer might argue lack of beneficial use might include a farmer 
using commodity grain that happens to contain patented technology as seed.  
 
 222. Id. at para. 56–57. 
 223. Id. at para. 57–58. 
 224. Id. at para. 57. 
 225. Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, para. 86 (Can.). 
 226. Id. at para. 158 (citing British United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Simon Collier 
Ltd. (1910), 27 R.P.C. 567 (H.L.)). 
 227. Id. at para. 86. 
 228. Id. 
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Such a farmer might argue that he is only using commodity grain as an inex-
pensive source of seed, without seeking to obtain any benefit from the patent-
ed trait, and that any presence of the patented trait in his fields is inadvertent, 
caused by the prevalence of the patented trait in the local seed population.  A 
farmer might even argue that planting saved Roundup Ready seed does not 
constitute infringement if he does not spray his fields with glyphosate, since 
he derives no benefit from the patented technology. 
In Organic Seed Growers, the Federal Circuit implied that it remains an 
open question whether an alleged infringer having no intent to benefit from a 
patented technology will necessarily be found liable for patent infringe-
ment.229  In fact, there have been a number of judicial decisions suggesting 
that not all technical “uses” of a patented invention constitute infringing 
use.230  Courts look to the underlying purpose of the invention, and at times 
will find that a technical use is not infringing because it does not avail itself 
of the benefits provided by this purpose.231  Chisum on Patents notes, for 
example, that “the defendant’s use must incorporate in some fashion the prin-
ciples of the claimed invention.”232 
We see this principle in cases such as Kaz Manufacturing Co. v. 
Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals de-
fined infringing use as “the commercially valuable use of which patentee 
would or could avail himself.”233  The court pointed out that the construction 
of a patented wall safe for use as an anchor for a boat, for example, would not 
be infringement because “such use would not be for the purpose of utilizing 
the teachings of the patent.”234  In Kaz, the Second Circuit ruled that the de-
fendant’s use of a literally infringing product for the purpose of advertising 
defendant’s product did not constitute patent infringement, noting that “the 
purpose to which an unauthorized construction of a patented article is put 
may determine whether the construction constitutes an infringement of the 
patentee’s rights.”235 
Similarly, in Quantum Group, Inc. v. American Sensor, Inc., the district 
court noted that although “[o]n its face, § 271(a) prohibits any and all uses of 
a patented invention[,] the term has never been taken to its utmost possible 
scope, and that in practice only ‘those uses that rely on the method or princi-
 
 229. Organic Seed Growers v. Monsanto, 718 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(“For purposes of this appeal, we will assume (without deciding) that using or selling 
windblown seeds would infringe any patents covering those seeds, regardless of 
whether the alleged infringer intended to benefit from the patented technologies.”). 
 230. See, e.g., Kaz Mfg. Co. v. Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 815 
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff’d, 317 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1963). 
 231. See id. at 817–18. 
 232. DONALD S. CHISUM, 4 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02[4]; see also Roche Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Bolar Pharms. Co., 572 F. Supp. 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (“To find infring-
ing use there must be a benefit at the expense of the patent.”). 
 233. Kaz Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp. at 818. 
 234. Kaz Mfg. Co., 317 F.2d at 680 n.3. 
 235. Id. 
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ples of a patent constitute infringement.’”236  The court applied this principle 
to the facts of the case, finding no infringement had occurred since 
“[c]ommon sense suggests that none of the activities in question involved any 
functional use of the infringing products.”237  Other courts have likewise, on 
occasion, dismissed infringement of a patentee’s right to use when the in-
fringing invention was “useless in function” and “such use would not be for 
the purpose of utilizing the teachings of the patent.”238  The Canadian courts 
have also noted that under prevailing precedent, infringing “use” of a patent-
ed product connotes “utilization with a view toward production or ad-
vantage,” and in a manner that deprives the inventor “in whole or in part, 
directly or indirectly, of the full enjoyment of the monopoly conferred by the 
Patent.”239 
The rationale adopted by the courts in the forgoing cases would seem to 
apply in the case of a farmer who has not been shown to have utilized the 
patented technology in a manner that provides any of the benefits associated 
with the invention.  Bowman actually made an argument along these lines, 
claiming to have planted commodity grain not for the purpose of obtaining 
the benefit of the patented Monsanto trait, but rather because he wanted an 
inexpensive source of seed, and that he had only infringed because Monsanto 
seeds are so prevalent in that area.240  Unfortunately for Bowman, it was im-
possible for him to plausibly argue that he was not using the trait, because the 
evidence showed that he had sprayed his fields with glyphosate.241  But in a 
case where the evidence of benefit to the farmer is less clear, one might imag-
ine a different outcome. 
The question of whether inadvertent use of a patented technology in a 
manner that provides no meaningful benefit to the user can constitute patent 
infringement was addressed by Judge Posner, sitting by designation as the 
district court judge in SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex.242  This case provides 
an interesting example of inadvertent infringement involving an essentially 
autonomously replicating pharmaceutical compound.  After acknowledging 
that as a general matter “inadvertancy is not a defense to infringement,” 
Judge Posner went on to conclude that inadvertent use of a patented product 
in a manner that does not benefit the technical infringer would not constitute 
 
 236. Quantum Group Inc. v. Am. Sensor Inc., No. 96 C 0761, 1998 WL 766707, 
at *6 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
 237. Id. 
 238. See Condenser Corp. v. Micamold Radio Corp., 145 F.2d 878, 880 (2d Cir. 
1944); see also Kaz Mfg. Co., 317 F.2d at 680–81. 
 239. Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, para. 58, 69 (Can.). 
 240. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836–37 (S.D. Ind. 2009). 
 241. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1765 (2013). 
 242. SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1028 (N.D. Ill. 
2003), aff’d, 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh’g granted in part and vacated, 403 
F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds on remand, 403 F.3d 1331 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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an infringing use “in any intelligible sense of the word.”243  Judge Posner 
found it significant that, under the facts of that case, the infringer “gain[ed] 
nothing [from the infringement, and the patent owner was] the sole cause of 
infringement.”244 
As to the question of whether the inadvertent sale of patented technolo-
gy necessarily constitutes infringement, Judge Posner posited a case where 
the inadvertent presence of a patented component in an alleged infringer’s 
product does not increase the value to consumers or reduce the cost of pro-
duction or sale, and concluded that such activity would not constitute “in a 
meaningful sense” an infringing sale of patented technology.245  Extending 
the logic of Judge Posner to patented seeds and farmers, it would often be the 
case that the sale of grain containing a patented trait should not be considered 
an infringing sale because the trait in no way increases the value of the grain 
as food or fodder.246  Furthermore, the presence of an herbicide tolerance trait 
like Roundup Ready would not affect the cost of production if that herbicide 
was not applied to the field.  However, if the trait does reduce the cost of 
production, for example, by providing drought tolerance or insect resistance, 
then perhaps this benefit would be sufficient to characterize the sale of the 
resulting grain as infringing. 
In fact, one might argue that in some cases a farmer who has planted his 
fields with Roundup Ready crops but does not spray the field with glyphosate 
has nonetheless benefited from the technology under the doctrine of “exigent 
use.”  Moy’s Walker on Patents defines exigent use as the “use of [an inven-
tion, the underlying function which is to be on hand and available for de-
ployment should an exigent situation arise,] occurs when the equipment is 
made ready for deployment, regardless of whether the equipment is later ac-
tually deployed.”247  An example would be the benefit derived from having a 
fire extinguisher hanging on the wall, even if the fire extinguisher is never 
used to put out a fire, since it provides a means to put out a fire should one 
erupt. 
For example, in Olsson v. United States, the Court of Claims held the 
United States liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 for keeping infringing howitzers 
ready for use in case of war, even though the weapons were never fired.248  
The court explained that the guns were being employed for the purpose of 
national defense, an exigent use that entitled the plaintiff to recover compen-
 
 243. Id. at 1028, 1031. 
 244. Id. at 1044. 
 245. Id. at 1031. 
 246. The vast majority of commercialized genetic traits are input traits, which 
increase the value of grain when used as seed, but not when used for food or feed.  
See, e.g., Lothar Willmitzer, Plant Biotechnology: Output Traits – The Second Gen-
eration of Plant Biotechnology Products is Gaining Momentum, 10 CURRENT 
OPINION IN BIOTECH. 161, 161 (1999), http://www.ufv.br/dbv/pgfvg/BVE684/htms/
pdfs_revisao/trangenicos_transformacao/willmitrev.pdf. 
 247. 4 MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 14:33 (4th ed.). 
 248. Olsson v. United States, 25 F. Supp. 495, 497–98 (Ct. Cl. 1938). 
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sation from the United States.249  Similarly, in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United 
States, the Court of Claims held that the “use of a system as a backup mode 
or to provide an extra measure of safety is ‘use’ within the meaning of 28 
U.S.C. § 1498.”250 
In much the same way that a fire extinguisher hanging on the wall clear-
ly has some beneficial value even if it is never used to put out fire, or that an 
airbag benefits passengers by providing an extra degree of safety even if it is 
never deployed, under some circumstances the presence of a herbicide re-
sistance trait might be characterized as providing beneficial value to a farmer 
even if the herbicide is never sprayed on the plants.  The same logic could 
apply to other traits, such as drought resistance or insect resistance, which can 
provide benefit even if the insect or drought is not a problem that a particular 
growing season because, like a fire extinguisher, it provides a ready mecha-
nism to deal with a problem such as drought in the event that it does occur. 
The Supreme Court of Canada addressed the applicability of the exigent 
use doctrine in the context of genetic traits in Schmeiser.  The court opined 
that even if Schmeiser had not used glyphosate on his fields, the fact that he 
had cultivated the seeds at all would likely constitute infringement because it 
allowed him to take advantage of the “stand-by,” or “insurance,” utility of the 
invention.251  That is, he gained benefit from having the Roundup Ready trait 
in his canola because if he needed to control weeds, he could have sprayed 
his crops with Roundup and taken advantage of the trait. 
But as a general matter, the inadvertent presence of some herbicide tol-
erant plants in a farmer’s field should not necessarily be considered exigent 
use, particularly if the farmer is not aware of its existence, or does not know 
what percentage of his crop bears the trait.  If he is not aware that he has 
Roundup Ready seeds growing in his field, for example, he will not be able to 
take advantage of any insurance utility because he will not realize that he has 
the option of spraying glyphosate on his fields to control weeds.  Further-
more, a farmer will not have the option of spraying with glyphosate unless he 
knows that the majority of his field includes glyphosate resistant soybean, 
because the application of glyphosate would not only kill the weeds, but 
would also kill any crops growing in his fields that do not bear the Roundup 
Ready trait. 
The proper resolution of a question of beneficial use might depend upon 
how a court defines the “patented invention.”  That is, should it be defined 
literally by the language of the claims, or should it be defined in terms of the 
gist or heart of the invention, i.e., the point of novelty and inventiveness with 
respect to the prior art?  Federal Circuit jurisprudence has stressed the im-
portance of formal interpretation and literal application of claim language, 
rather than analysis that would seek to discern the heart of a patented inven-
 
 249. Id. at 656–57. 
 250. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, No. 426-73, 1982 WL 36740, at *37  
(Ct. Cl. Trial Div. 1982), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 251. Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, para. 84 (Can.). 
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tion.252  But in a recent article, Lemley persuasively argued that in many in-
stances, the courts, at least implicitly, seem to be focusing the analysis on 
what they view to be the gist of the invention.253  This “gist of the invention” 
approach has also featured prominently in recent Supreme Court decisions, 
including Quanta, Bilski, and Mayo.254 
The resolution of this issue could in some cases depend upon the specif-
ic language of each claim at issue in that particular case.  Patents directed 
towards genetically modified seeds and plants typically include multiple 
claims defining the invention at different levels of abstraction and specifici-
ty.255  For example, the core claim is typically directed toward the genetic 
material itself, i.e., the DNA construct that constitutes the trait.256  A plausible 
argument could be made that a farmer cultivating a seed harboring a patented 
DNA construct is not using the DNA construct if he is not making any use of 
it in the common sense of the word.  For instance, if the patent claim recites 
the DNA construct that confers herbicide resistance, and the farmer never 
sprays his crop with that herbicide, a good argument might be made that he is 
not using that DNA construct. 
Patents on plant genetic traits typically also contain claims directed to-
wards seeds and plants comprising the DNA construct.257  But regardless of 
how the invention is claimed, the gist of the invention remains the DNA con-
struct.  One might argue that even though a farmer has cultivated a seed that 
falls within the literal scope of the patent claim, the actual invention remains 
the transgenic DNA construct which is not being used. 
Introducing elements of benefit and intent to direct infringement could 
help to shield some farmers from liability who clearly seem to deserve it.  
Consider, for example, the organic farmer plaintiffs in Organic Seed Grow-
 
 252. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (Moore, J., dissenting in part) (“Federal Circuit precedent [has] abolished the 
‘heart of the invention’ analysis for patentability.”); see also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Con-
vertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345 (1961) (“[T]here is no legally rec-
ognizable or protected ‘essential’ element, ‘gist’ or ‘heart’ of the invention.”). 
 253. Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253, 1255 (2011); 
see also Bernard Chao, Breaking Aro’s Commandment: Recognizing That Inventions 
Have Heart, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1183 (2010). 
 254. See, e.g., Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics, 553 U.S. 617, 1238–39 
(2010); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).  For discussion of “gist of inven-
tion” approach, see, e.g., Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Aro Mfg. Co., 365 U.S. at 345) (“It is well settled that 
‘there is no legally recognizable or protected essential element, gist or heart of the 
invention in a combination patent.’”). 
 255. See, e.g., the patents infringed by Bowman: U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605 (is-
sued Dec. 4, 1994) and U.S. Patent No. RE39,247E (issued Aug. 22, 2006).  Bowman 
v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013). 
 256. See, e.g., Claim 1 of the ’605 Patent and Claim 103 of the ’247E Patent. 
 257. See, e.g., Claim 4 of the ’605 Patent and Claims 122 and 129 of the ’247E 
Patent. 
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ers, who claim that they live in fear of being sued by Monsanto for patent 
infringement that is inadvertent and unavoidable.258  With respect to these 
organic farmers, the presence of transgenic organisms in the farmer’s field 
would not increase the value of his crops nor would it reduce the farmer’s 
cost of production.259  To the contrary, the presence of transgenic organisms 
might even prevent the farmer from selling his crop (especially if he is an 
organic farmer).260  The farmer derives no benefit from the technology, and in 
the spirit of Judge Posner’s decision in SmithKline Beecham should not be 
found to have made, used, or sold the patented technology in a manner that 
would constitute infringement. 
Consider also the case of a farmer who plants his fields with commodity 
grain purchased from a grain elevator.  In some cases, it will be relatively 
straightforward to establish that the farmer knowingly benefited from the 
patented technology, and thus should be held liable for infringement.  A 
farmer like Bowman is a good example.  Another might be a farmer who has 
purchased and replanted commodity seeds from a grain elevator in a case 
wherein the patented trait confers resistance to a particular type of insect.  
Depending upon the surrounding circumstances, this farmer could be found to 
be purposefully using the benefit patented trait to the same extent as Bow-
man.  For example, if the targeted pest is a major problem on this farmer’s 
fields, such that the farmer could not successfully grow the crop without the 
trait, then this farmer might be reasonably characterized as using the trait to 
the same extent as Bowman.  If he would have absolutely been required to 
use some chemical pesticide were it not for the recombinant trait, then the 
failure to use such a chemical could be seen as overt evidence of intentionally 
taking advantage of the benefit of the patented trait, analogous to Bowman’s 
use of glyphosate.  Based on these facts, it should be no problem to find in-
fringement. 
But change the facts a bit, and we might end up with a circumstance un-
der which it seems clear that the farmer should not be held liable.  What if it 
turns out that the pest targeted by the trait is not a problem at all for this 
farmer, perhaps because it is only present during a different time of year, or in 
a different part of the country?  Or what if the farmer can introduce evidence 
that he applied pesticide sufficient to deal with the pest, such that he obtained 
no advantage from the genetic trait?  In a very pragmatic sense, this farmer 
has not “used” the trait which is the subject of the patent, and by focusing on 
 
 258. See Organic Seed Growers v. Monsanto, 718 F.3d 1350, 1354 (2013). 
 259. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1031 
(2003), aff’d, 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh’g granted in part and vacated, 403 
F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds on remand, 403 F.3d 1331 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 260. Petition Letter from George Kimbrell, Senior Attorney, Ctr. for Food Safety, 
to Tom Vilsack, Sec’y, USDA (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/
files/cfs_petition_usda_alfalfa-contamination_9_26_2013_final_57348.pdf (organic 
farmer prohibited from selling his crop when an organic buyer found transgenic alfal-
fa seeds in the crop being sold). 
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benefit the court could arrive at the intuitively reasonable outcome that no 
infringement has occurred. 
The truly hard case might lie somewhere between the extreme scenarios 
set forth above. Imagine a case where the insect targeted by a patented trait in 
commodity grain represents a slight but non-trivial threat to a farmer’s crops?  
And what if a farmer who decides to use the commodity grain as an inexpen-
sive source of seed can plausibly claim that he was willing to live with a cer-
tain level of damage from the insect, and was not willing to pay for the pa-
tented trait designed to deal with it?  The farmer might argue that he should 
not be compelled to pay for a technology he does not want or need, regardless 
of whether he might inadvertently obtain some benefit from it.  A patent 
owner like Monsanto, on the other hand, might argue that the intent of the 
farmer is irrelevant, and that the farmer has benefited from the technology 
and should be required to pay for its use. 
If such a case were presented to the court, the outcome might depend 
upon the court’s policy leanings.  For example, are the overall objectives of 
the patent system better served by protecting the ability of farmers to use 
commodity grain as seed without being required to pay for patented technol-
ogy inadvertently present in the grain, or by ensuring that innovators like 
Monsanto are compensated by those who benefit from the technology, even if 
that benefit appears to be inadvertent?  Given that the burden of proving in-
fringement always lies with the patentee, an argument might be made that 
when there is some ambiguity regarding intent and benefit, the default rule 
should be to decide the case in favor of the alleged infringer. 
4.  Autonomous and Indirect Infringement 
Under the right circumstances, a court might be able to avoid imposing 
liability on an alleged inadvertent infringer by attributing the making and 
using of the product to the product itself rather than to any human agent.  In 
fact, Bowman and Schmeiser both argued that, since plants are autonomous 
beings, their growth and propagation should not be attributed to the farmer, 
and that the role played by the farmer is not sufficiently active to constitute 
an infringing making or use of the patented plant material.261  Arguments of 
this type no doubt have some intuitive appeal.  The common understanding of 
the terms “make” and “use” clearly contemplate the maker or user taking 
some positive action of some sort.  For instance, Merriam-Webster defines 
“use” as “to put into action or service: avail oneself of,”262 and “make” as “to 
cause to happen to or be experienced by someone; to cause to exist, occur, or 
 
 261. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1768–69 (2013); Monsanto Can. 
Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, para. 90 (Can.). 
 262. Use, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/use 
(last visited July 5, 2015). 
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appear.”263  To the extent plants truly are responsible for their own replica-
tion, should not their making and using of the seeds be attributed to the plant 
itself, thereby absolving farmers of liability? 
On the specific facts of Bowman and Schmeiser, U.S. and Canadian 
courts have had no trouble rejecting this argument of autonomous replication, 
based on the evidence in each case establishing the substantial active role 
both accused farmers had taken in planting and cultivating the seeds.  The 
Supreme Court of Canada pointed out that Schmeiser’s suggestion that the 
infringing crop had merely “‘grown itself’ . . . denies the realities of modern 
agriculture [and] ignores the role human beings play in agricultural propaga-
tion.”264  The court concluded that a farmer’s acts of sowing and cultivating 
plants “necessarily involves deliberate and careful activity on the part of the 
farmer,” sufficient to qualify as making or using under the patent statute.265  
The Supreme Court of the United States similarly concluded, “[I]t was Bow-
man, and not the bean, who controlled the reproduction (unto the eighth gen-
eration) of Monsanto’s patented invention.”266 
But perhaps the argument would find some traction if it were presented 
by a farmer who could more plausibly argue that the presence of patented 
plants in his fields was truly inadvertent.  There are clearly circumstances 
under which it makes no sense to attribute the growth and replication of a 
plant to any human agency, including some cases that might lead to an allega-
tion of inadvertent infringement.  The genetic drift scenario is a good exam-
ple – growth of a plant that spuriously appears in a farmer’s field should not 
be attributed to the farmer, and should not serve as the basis for a finding of 
patent infringement.  Of course, the difficult question that might arise is 
where to draw the line between the two extremes of a farmer like Bowman, 
who actively cultivates a patented plant, and the farmer whose fields have 
been contaminated by a patented plant as a result of a seed being carried there 
by wind or an animal. 
Note that even in a case where a court absolves a farmer from liability 
for direct infringement by attributing replication of patented plant material to 
the plant itself, it might still be possible to hold the farmer liable for inducing 
infringement.  Significantly, patent inducement is not a matter of strict liabil-
ity, and it would be necessary to establish that the farmer had intentionally 
induced the seed to replicate and grow and knew that this would constitute 
patent infringement, which would go a long way in shielding inadvertent 
infringers from liability.267  This approach might even be generally applicable 
to self-replicating technologies, providing a mechanism for introducing an 
 
 263. Make, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
make (last visited July 5, 2015). 
 264. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, at para. 90, 92. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769. 
 267. Supra Part VIII. 
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intent element without altering the definition of infringement for non-self-
replicating technologies. 
B.  Equitable Defenses 
Another approach to addressing a plausible case of inadvertent in-
fringement would be for the court to invoke its inherent authority to create a 
new equitable defense to patent infringement.  There are numerous examples 
of equitable defenses in patent law, including the defenses of inequitable 
conduct, experimental use, and patent misuse.268  These defenses have been 
created by the courts to address situations that arise from time to time, and 
which are not adequately addressed by the statute, in a manner that furthers 
public policy and the overall objectives of the patent statute.269  There is noth-
ing to prevent the courts from invoking their equitable authority in this man-
ner if confronted with a legitimate case of inadvertent infringement. 
Such an approach was championed by Judge Posner in SmithKline Bee-
cham, in which he was faced with a situation where a finding of infringement 
threatened to block a generic drug company “from producing a public-domain 
product[,] however strenuous the efforts they make to avoid committing a 
purely nominal infringement.”270  After acknowledging that he could not find 
any statutory language or case law bearing on the question, Judge Posner 
proposed, “[A]s a matter of fundamental principle it must be a defense to a 
charge of patent infringement that the patentee caused the infringement.”271  
In support of this proposition, he pointed out that it “is a completely orthodox 
defense to a suit for breach of contract that the plaintiff prevented the defend-
ant from performing his contractual duty,” and found the logic behind this 
fundamental principle of law equally applicable in the case of an inadvertent 
infringer like the generic drug company in this case.272 
Judge Posner further proposed that enforcement of a patent against an 
inadvertent infringer under circumstances where the patent owner’s actions 
made the infringement unavoidable could be considered a form of patent 
misuse.  According to Judge Posner, “[W]hen the advance of science . . . ena-
bles a form of patent misuse that is new but is well within the conceptual 
heartland of the doctrine, the boundaries of the doctrine can expand modestly 
 
 268. See, e.g., Qualcomm Inc. v.  Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1025 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008); see also City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 
133 (1877). 
 269. See Glitsch, Inc. v. Koch Eng’g Co., 216 F.3d 1382, 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (citing Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 670 (1944)). 
 270. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1044 
(N.D. Ill. 2003), aff’d, 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh’g granted in part and 
vacated, 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds on remand, 403 
F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 271. Id. at 1043. 
 272. Id. 
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to encompass it.”273  He cited the Federal Circuit’s 1999 decision in AT&T v. 
Excel Communications for the proposition that the “sea-changes in both law 
and technology stand as a testament to the ability of law to adapt to new and 
innovative concepts, while remaining true to basic principles.”274 
C.  Remedies as a Policy Lever 
One should not lose sight of the fact that a finding of infringement, in 
and of itself, really has no adverse consequences for the infringer in the ab-
sence of a substantial award of remedies.275  This is the logic behind 35 
U.S.C. § 287(c), pursuant to which health care providers are exempt from any 
remedy for infringement of a medical procedure patent.  While, as a technical 
matter, a doctor can still be found to have infringed a patent, she has no rea-
son to fear a lawsuit because she cannot be assessed money damages and 
cannot be enjoined.  As a corollary, patent owners have no reason to file a 
lawsuit against doctors for infringing patents covered by Section 287(c), alt-
hough infringement by a healthcare provider could form the basis for an indi-
rect infringement action against a non-healthcare provider who induced or 
contributed to infringement. 
The important role remedies play in ameliorating potential concerns re-
lating to the sorts of technical acts of infringement, that might otherwise trig-
ger significant policy concerns, have been noted by the courts.  For example, 
in Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., Judge Rader opined that de 
minimis and experimental use exceptions are not needed in the United States 
in part because, as a practical matter, the absence of substantial remedies 
achieves the same outcome.276  This can be seen, for example, in Condenser 
Corp. of America v. Micamold Radio Corp., where the Second Circuit refused 
to enjoin the technically infringing defendant’s machine for a detail that the 
court characterized as useless in function and of too trifling importance to 
justify the intervention of a court.277  With respect to damages, the court held 
that it would be equally unwarranted to give judgment for damages or profits; 
for it is inconceivable that the infringement, if there is any at all – which is 
doubtful at best – could add a cent to the defendant’s profits, or could inter-
fere in the slightest degree with the plaintiff’s sales.278 
Similarly, in Schmeiser the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal suggested 
that, in a case of inadvertent infringement, the patentee might be denied any 
remedy, finding it to be an open question whether a seed patent owner like 
 
 273. Id. at 1046–47. 
 274. Id. at 1047 (citing AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 
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Monsanto could under all circumstances obtain a remedy for infringement on 
the basis that the intention of the alleged infringer is irrelevant.279  Particular 
situations identified by the court wherein a remedy might not be warranted in 
the absence of intent would be when “a plant containing [a patented gene 
arrives] fortuitously onto the property of a person who has no reason to be 
aware of the presence of the characteristic created by the patented gene.”280  
The court also opined that even a farmer who becomes aware of the presence 
of the patented plant on his property might tolerate its presence without doing 
anything to cause or promote the propagation of the plant or its progeny 
without incurring liability that would result in a remedy.281  In SmithKline 
Beecham v. Apotex, Judge Posner also suggested a denial of remedies as a 
potential solution to the problem of inadvertent infringement.282 
IX.  A LEGAL RESPONSE SHOULD BE NARROW AND TAILORED TO 
SPECIFIC AND SUBSTANTIATED DEFICIENCIES IN THE CURRENT 
SYSTEM 
With the increasing prevalence of self-replicating technologies, the per-
ceived potential of innocent parties being held liable for inadvertent in-
fringement could lead to increasing calls for reform of patent law in order to 
address the issue.  In Bowman, the Supreme Court turned aside the attempt 
for the time being, but left the door open for doing so at a time when it is 
presented squarely with a case involving a truly inadvertent infringer.  If the 
courts or Congress do decide to take action to address the issue, it is im-
portant that they do so in a manner that is conservative and narrowly tailored 
to address the concern without unduly creating ancillary harm to the patent 
system. 
The preceding Part describes various possibilities for courts to interpret 
and deploy existing doctrines of patent law in a manner that would shield a 
legitimate inadvertent infringer from liability.  The calls for extreme 
measures, such as patent exhaustion for all self-replicating technologies, inva-
lidity based on patent ineligibility, or lack of moral utility for self-replicating 
technologies, do not appear to be necessary and clearly should not be invoked 
at this early stage when lawsuits against inadvertent infringers remain of 
largely hypothetical concern. 
Likewise, if Congress chooses to address the issue with legislation, it 
should do so in a manner that is as narrow and targeted as possible.  There are 
 
 279. Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser (C.A.) [2003] 2 F.C. 165, para. 57 (Fed. 
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 282. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1045–46 
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a number of examples of Congress enacting legislation to address perceived 
policy concerns in a manner that did not unduly harm the incentives of the IP 
system.  For example, to address concerns associated with the technical act of 
copyright infringement that occurs whenever use of a computer program re-
sults in the production of a new copy, Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. §117, 
which states in part that: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 [defining infringe-
ment], it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer 
program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adapta-
tion of that computer program provided . . . that such a new copy or 
adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the com-
puter program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no 
other manner . . . .283 
This statutory fix addresses the potential for inadvertent infringement 
caused by the self-replicating nature of computer software, without unduly 
interfering with the rights of copyright owners.  Significantly, instead of 
granting a blanket license to make copies, 17 U.S.C. § 117 limits the scope of 
the license based on the use that is made of the copy and does not permit the 
owner of the computer program to use the copy in a manner contrary to the 
legitimate business interests of the copyright owner, e.g., by distributing cop-
ies to other computer users. 
Similarly, Congress addressed concerns associated with the potential for 
doctors to be sued for infringing patents in the course of performing medical 
procedures by enacting 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), which provides that doctors are 
not subject to the imposition of any remedy for infringement under such cir-
cumstances.  The limitation on patent rights is narrow and targeted, leaving 
intact the patentability of medical procedures and permitting patentees to 
enforce their patents against competitors who contribute to or induce in-
fringement by doctors. 
Although the spirit of Section 287(c) stands as a useful model for any 
congressional response to the issue of inadvertent patent infringement, the 
specific approach is probably not directly applicable to patented seeds.  Sec-
tion 287(c) works because patent owners can generally derive benefit from 
their patents on methods of treatment by enforcing their patents against com-
peting companies that provide the tools used by doctors to perform the treat-
ments, relying on theories of indirect infringement.  There is generally no 
need to file lawsuits directly against doctors and, for the most part, patent 
owners have no desire to file lawsuits against doctors.284 
In contrast, farmers will often be the only viable target for an infringe-
ment lawsuit by a seed patent owner.  Monsanto would no doubt be in a much 
 
 283. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2012). 
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better position if the company could avoid suing farmers altogether, and in-
deed its patenting activities would probably be much less controversial if that 
were the case, but unfortunately there will always be some percentage of 
farmers who seek to obtain an advantage over other farmers by using a pa-
tented trait without paying for it, either by saving and replanting authorized 
seed, or by purchasing seed that was not intended to be replanted and planting 
it anyway.  If the patent owner is unwilling to enforce its patent against farm-
ers who choose not to pay for the technology, the patent will have little if any 
value since other farmers will learn that they do not need to respect it, and can 
themselves avoid paying for the technology while obtaining its benefit.  In 
fact, in an environment where some farmers are infringing with impunity, 
other farmers are in a sense compelled to infringe also, or else be put at a 
competitive disadvantage with the infringing farmer.  At least in the current 
environment, seed patent owners must be willing and able to enforce their 
patents against farmers, otherwise patents will cease to be a viable mecha-
nism for capturing value and will no longer function as an incentive for in-
vestment in further innovation. 
X.  LEARNING FROM COPYRIGHT LAW’S RESPONSE TO THE SELF-
REPLICATION OF DIGITAL CONTENT 
In considering legal fixes for potential problems relating to inadvertent 
infringement of self-replicating technologies, it might be useful to learn from 
and even model legal solutions that have been implemented to address con-
cerns relating to the ease with which copyrighted digital content is replicated 
and propagated over the Internet.  The overall objective is to protect poten-
tially inadvertent infringers while at the same time ensuring, to the extent 
possible, adequate means for copyright owners to enforce their rights.  In 
practice, this often entails imposing some burden on potential infringers to 
take affirmative steps to avoid inadvertent infringement, or at least to cooper-
ate with efforts of copyright owners to enforce their rights. 
For example, courts have on occasion found Internet Service Providers 
liable for copyright infringement under circumstances in which the provider 
failed to take reasonable measures to prevent infringement, irrespective of 
whether the infringement was inadvertent.  In Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, the 
Ninth Circuit held that Google could be held contributorily liable if it had 
knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were available using its search 
engine, could take simple measures to impede further infringement of Perfect 
10’s copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps.285  In the same vein, the 
Second Circuit has held that a willfully blind Internet Service Provider could 
be held liable even in the absence of specific intent or knowledge of infring-
ing activities.286 
 
 285. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 
2007).  But see Perfect 10 v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3rd 788 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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Applying these principles to a patented self-replicating technology like 
Monsanto’s seeds, a farmer’s liability could depend upon the farmer’s ability 
to control the extent of infringement, and perhaps the degree to which the 
farmer profits from the infringement.  A recent summary judgment decision 
issued in Disney Enterprises v. Hotfile provides some interesting insight in 
this regard.287  The district court entered summary judgment finding Hotfile 
liable for vicarious copyright infringement based on the manner in which the 
company provides an online storage locker service containing many copy-
righted movies and television shows.288  The copyright owners were able to 
prevail in this case by establishing that Hotfile has the right and ability to 
control the infringement, and is directly profiting from the infringement.289  
Significantly, it was not necessary to prove that Hotfile contributed to the 
infringement, or was even aware of it.290  A similar rationale might be applied 
to farmers and grain elevator operators under circumstances in which a court 
finds that the entity is profiting from the infringement and has the ability to 
control it. 
The doctrine of vicarious infringement exemplified by Hotfile has not, 
to the best of my knowledge, been extended to patent law.  But the courts are 
quite adept at adapting judicial innovations in copyright to patent law and 
vice versa.  For example, in Sony, the Supreme Court incorporated principles 
from patent laws doctrine of contributory infringement into copyright law.291  
Similarly, in eBay v. Mercexchange, the Supreme Court cited the Copyright 
Act in defining the criteria to be considered by a court when entering an in-
junction against a patent infringer.292  Note that these refinements of copy-
right and patent law are often triggered by advances in technology, and it 
seems well within the realm of possibility that advances in self-replicating 
technologies might spur similar judicial activity. 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), enacted by Congress 
in 1988, largely in response to the ease with which copyrighted digital con-
tent replicates and propagates over the Internet, addresses the problem of 
inadvertent infringement by creating safe harbors for parties like Internet 
Service Providers who might otherwise face liability for inadvertent in-
fringement resulting from their activities.293  At the same time, the DMCA 
seeks to maintain effective copyright protection by requiring those seeking to 
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avail themselves of the safe harbors to engage in certain activities that assist, 
or at least do not impede, the ability of the copyright owner to detect and 
enforce copyright against willful infringers.294  For example, service provid-
ers are required to reasonably accommodate technologies that would allow 
the copyright owner to detect or prevent infringement.295 
Congress could consider legislation that would adapt something like the 
DMCA approach to the policy concerns associated with patented self-
replicating technologies and inadvertent infringement.  Such a legislative 
approach could provide some form of safe harbor for farmers, and perhaps 
other potential inadvertent infringers such as seed cleaners and grain elevator 
operators.  It would likely raise the interesting policy question of how to allo-
cate the burden of responsibility for implementing measures to minimize the 
incidence of inadvertent infringement, for example, by testing seeds to check 
for the presence of patented technology, or by taking measures to segregate 
patented seed from unpatented seed, or to prevent genetic drift.  Is it the re-
sponsibility of a patent owner like Monsanto to make sure that its patented 
seeds are not intermingled with generic seeds in grain elevators?  Or do grain 
elevator operators have some duty to make sure that farmers buying commod-
ity grain for use as seed do not buy the patented product, i.e., by monitoring 
and sequestering the commodity in a way that they have not been before? 
To take a specific example, consider a farmer operating in an environ-
ment in which both generic Roundup Ready 1 and patented Roundup Ready 2 
are widely used.  If said farmer chooses to buy commodity grain for use as 
seed, should the law impose a duty on the farmer to make sure he is not plant-
ing patented Roundup Ready 2 seeds, even though he is perfectly within his 
rights to plant the generic Roundup Ready seeds?  To hold the farmer strictly 
liable if he plants any patented seeds, which could effectively result in a de 
facto prohibition against planting of commodity seeds, would arguably im-
pinge upon the traditional ability of farmers to use commodity grain as seed.  
A DMCA-style approach could grant some sort of safe harbor to such a 
farmer, but should also impose an obligation on the farmer to take reasonable 
measures to avoid using patented technology.  For example, if a patent owner 
like Monsanto develops methods for testing and distinguishing between pa-
tented and non-patented seeds, there should be some obligation on the farmer 
to cooperate to some extent, or at least not to interfere with the patent owner’s 
efforts to implement such an approach. 
XI.  GENETIC USE RESTRICTION TECHNOLOGIES 
Given the practical difficulties associated with enforcing patents against 
farmers, developers of self-replicating technologies such as Monsanto would 
do well to consider alternate approaches to appropriating the value created by 
their investment in innovative technologies.  One approach would be to intro-
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duce some sort of technical restriction on copying.  Little anger is directed 
toward the developer of an improved hybrid corn simply because farmers 
have to buy the seed every year if they want to benefit from the improve-
ments in the hybrid seed.  But using a patent to require the same thing, i.e., 
that a farmer pays for improvements to the seed each time he plants the seed, 
is an entirely different matter.  It is not rational, but the reality is that people 
generally do not have a problem with farmers having to buy seed every year 
if it is based on a technological restriction, but to achieve the same result by 
means of patents is viewed by many as somehow improper. 
In principle, the technology for restricting access to second-generation 
copies of patented seeds is available, although it has never been used in a 
Monsanto product, perhaps in part due to the negative public perception asso-
ciated with the technology.  Opponents of the technology have dubbed it 
“Terminator,” and unfortunately the name has stuck and is even at times used 
by Monsanto, but a more accurate and neutral terminology is Genetic Use 
Restriction Technologies (“GURTs”).296  GURTs come in two forms, varie-
tal-GURTs (“V-GURTs”) and trait-GURTs (“T-GURTs”).297  A plant incor-
porating a V-GURT produces sterile seeds, which are perfectly fine for use as 
feed or fodder, but which cannot be saved and replanted by farmers.298  The 
sterility of seeds incorporating V-GURTs led to the Terminator label, and a 
great deal of opposition from NGOs and others concerned with the implica-
tions of the technology, particularly for farmers in developing nations.299  In 
2000, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (“UNCBD”) 
recommended a de facto moratorium on field-testing and commercial sale of 
terminator seeds; the moratorium was re-affirmed and the language strength-
ened in March 2006 at the COP8 meeting of the UNCBD.300  Monsanto has 
publicly pledged to forgo the use of V-GURTs, and the prospects for utilizing 
the technology in commercialized transgenic seeds seems highly unlikely in 
the foreseeable future.301 
T-GURTs, on the other hand, do not result in sterile seeds.  Instead, T-
GURTs regulate the expression of a specific transgenic trait (hence the term 
T-GURT) in a plant while enabling plants to remain fertile and to produce 
viable seeds.302  For example, a T-GURT might function by modifying a crop 
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in such a way that the genetic trait engineered into the crop does not function 
until the crop plant is treated with a chemical that is sold by the biotechnolo-
gy company.303  A farmer using a seed protected by T-GURT technology 
could save and replant seeds, but would not obtain the benefit of the en-
hanced trait in the crop unless they purchase the activator compound. 
T-GURTs could be a useful approach that would avoid much of the 
Terminator controversy surrounding V-GURTs, resulting in a product more 
analogous to hybrid corn, i.e., capable of replication but with the loss of valu-
able attributes in second-generation seeds.  But in the long run, the world 
community should reconsider the validity of the opposition to V-GURTs.  
The use of this technology in genetically engineered crops could be tremen-
dously beneficial in numerous ways, extending beyond their potential to pro-
vide an alternative to patents for innovators attempting to secure compensa-
tion for use of their technology.  For example, it would address concerns 
about the drift of transgenic DNA or the escape of genetically modified crops 
into the environment.304  GURTs could also provide technical benefits for 
farmers.  Use of V-GURTs could reduce the propagation of volunteer plants, 
which can reduce the efficiency of crop rotation practices.305  It can also alle-
viate the problem of sprouting that can occur in non V-GURT grain under 
warm, wet harvest conditions.306 
CONCLUSION 
The increasing prevalence of self-replicating patentable technologies 
will, in all likelihood, compel the patent system to address the issue of inad-
vertent infringement head on, and it is imperative that it do so in a manner 
that does not unduly impinge upon the ability of innovators to achieve ade-
quate protection for their inventions.  Proposals to impose compulsory licens-
ing schemes on self-replicating technologies, or to exhaust patent rights with 
respect to second-generation self-replicating technologies, or even to deny 
self-replicating technologies patent protection altogether, based on an alleged 
lack of patent eligibility or moral utility, would do just that, and do not appear 
to be warranted by what is currently a largely hypothetical concern over inad-
vertent infringement.  There are established doctrines of patent law that could 
be adopted to address cases of inadvertent infringement if and when they are 
actually presented before a court.  If the courts or Congress choose to enact 
novel legal doctrine to address inadvertent infringement, it should be con-
servative in nature, perhaps learning from the manner in which courts and 
Congress have addressed the proliferation of easily replicable copyrightable 
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subject matter on the Internet.  Still, as a matter of prudence, innovators in 
self-replicating technologies might want to consider an increased emphasis on 
non-patent mechanisms for restricting unauthorized copying of self-
replicating technologies, including the implementation of technological re-
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